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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

CARLOS ESQUIVEL,
)

Petitioner-Appellant,

1
)
)
)
)
)
)

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

ORDER TAKTNG JUDICIAL
NOTICE
Supreme Court Docket No. 357922008
Ada County Docket # 2005-561
>I/

//!
3>.

;!,

I

The Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court October 24, 2008. A
Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record was filed July 5, 2007 in related appeal No. 32689,

/Ii
I;/
/jiI;j
!I!

jll

Esquivel v. State; therefore good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that this Court shall take JUDICIAL NOTICE of the
Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 32689, Esquivel v. State.

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a

'.I

/I!

/,I

LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall' contain the documents requested in

/j;

the Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any documents

ill

filed in prior appeal No. 32689.

$1

:ji

!lj

ljj

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare and
lodge a SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT, which shall include the proceedings

;!I

1

3

j/

!!I

//I

requested in the Notice of Appeal, but shall not duplicate any proceedings included in the
Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 32689. The LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD and
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT shall be filed with this Court after settlement.

I
I;

i!
1l

I/
ij

DATED this 10" day of November 2008.

!I

For the Supreme Court

A

Stephen ~ f h y o qClerk
cc: Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Reporter

(I,
t o

i;'

i

i
I

!1

e

Date: 12/8/2008
Time: 11:38 AM

-
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User: CCTHIEBJ

h Judicial District Court Ada Count
ROA Report
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Case: CV-PC-2005-22055 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey
Carlos Esquivel, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Carlos Esquivel, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Judge

Code

User

NEWC

CCCOLEMJ

New Case Filed

Cheri C. Copsey

CCCOLEMJ

Post Conviction Relief Filing

Cheri C. Copsey

MOAF

CCCOLEMJ

Motion & Affidavit For Fee Waiver

Cheri C. Copsey

MOAF

CCCOLEMJ

Motion & Affidavit For Appointment Of Counsel

Cheri C. Copsey

CERT

CCCOLEMJ

Certificate Of Mailing

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Order Denying Mtn For Appt Of Counsel

Cheri C. Copsey

MlSC

CCBLACJE

Verified Mtn For Enlargement Of Time

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Order Granting Mtn For Enlargement Of Time

Cheri C. Copsey

AM EN

CCRIVEDA

Amen Apllication For Post Conviction Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCRIVEDA

Petitioners Renewed Motn For Apntmnt Of Couns Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCRIVEDA

Motn For Leave To Conduct Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

DCANDEML

Order Denying Request For Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

DCANDEML

Second Order Denying Appointment Of Counsel Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion To Reconsider

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Order Denying Mtn To Reconsider Request For

Cheri C. Copsey

CONT

CCGROSPS

Appt Of Counsel

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Order Cond.dismissing Amended Ptition For PC

Cheri C. Copsey

MlSC

CCMARTLG

Declaration For Entry Of Default

Cheri C. Copsey

RPLY

CCMARTLG

Reply To Ordr Denying Motn To Reconsider

Cheri C. Copsey

CONT

CCMARTLG

Requests For Disc & Appt Counsel, & Ordr

Cheri C. Copsey

CONT

CCMARTLG

Cond Dismiss Amed Petn Post Cnvctn Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

CONT

CCMARTLG

& Petnr's Motn Dq Cause Verified

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCWATSCL

State's Motion To Dismiss The Amended Petn

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

CCGROSPS

Notice Of Hearing - (1211212005) Cheri C. Copsey Cheri C. Copsey

HRHD

CCGROSPS

Hearing Held

Cheri C. Copsey

DSBT

CCGROSPS

Order DismissingAmended Petition For PC

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion For Evid Hearing

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Order Denying Mtn For Evid Hearing

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion For Enlargement Of Time

Cheri C. Copsey

RSPS

CCMARTLG

Petnr's Response To State's Motn Dsmss Amend Cheri C. Copsey

CONT

CCMARTLG

Petn Post Cnvctn Relf Failure State Claim

Cheri C. Copsey

AFSM

CCMARTLG

Affidavit In Support Petnr's Rsps State's

Cheri C. Copsey

CONT

CC MARTLG

Motn Dsmss Amend Petn Post Cnvctn Relf

Cheri C. Copsey

CONT

CCMARTLG

Failure State Claim Relf Granted

Cheri C. Copsey

NOTC

CCTHIEBJ

Notice Of Appeal

Cheri C. Copsey

MOAF

CCTHIEBJ

Motion & AffKlavit For Appointment Of Counsel

Cheri C. C @ 8 h o 4

MOAF

CCTHIEBJ

Motion & Affidavit For Fee Waiver

Cheri C. Copsey

Date: 12/8/2008
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Case: CV-PC-2005-22055 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey
Carlos Esquivel, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Carlos Esquivel, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

Judge

113112006

ORDR

CCGROSPS

Order Denying Mtn for Appt of Counsel on Appeal Cheri C. Copsey

21112006

ORDG

DCANDEML

Order Granted Waiver of Fees

Cheri C. Copsey

81812007

OPIN

CCLUNDMJ

Opinion filed - Supreme Ct #32689

Cheri C. Copsey

REMT

CCTHIEBJ

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCDWONCP

Remittitur - Remanded Supreme Court Docket
No. 32689
Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

DCANDEML

Order Appointing Counsel

Cheri C. Copsey

NOAP

CCBLACJE

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

DCANDEML

NOTC

DCANDEML

Notice Of Appearance
(Davis for Carlos Esquivel)
Hearing Scheduled (Status 11/29/2007 02:OO
PM)
Notice of Hearing 11129107 @ 2 p.m.

MOTN

CCMARTLG

ORDR

DCANDEML

HRHD

TCW EATJB

AMEN

CCMARTLG

ANSW

Cheri C. Copsey
Cheri C. Copsey

Respondent's Motion To Release Defense File To Cheri C. Copsey
The State for UPCPA Action
Order Waiving Confidentiality of the Public
Cheri C. Copsey
Defender and the Criminal File in H0300476
Hearing result for Status held on 11/29/2007
02:OO PM: Hearing Held
Second Amended Petn And Affd For Post
Conviction Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

CCEARLJD

Respondents Answer to the Second Amended
Petition for Post Conviction Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

BREF

CCEARLJD

Brief in Support of Summary Dismissal

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Cheri C. Copsey

AFFD

CCMARTLG

Motion To Dismiss Second Amended Petn For
Post Conviction Relief
Affidavit Of Eric Rolfsen

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

DCDANSEL

Order to Transport 614108

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

DCDANSEL

Cheri C. Copsey

HRVC

DCDANSEL

ORDR

DCDANSEL

Hearing Scheduled (Post Conviction Relief
06/04/2008 11:00 AM) Evidentiary Hearing
Hearing result for Post Conviction Relief held on
06/04/2008 11:00 AM: Hearing Vacated
Evidentiary Hearing
Scheduling Order

Cheri C. Copsey

ORDR

DCDANSEL

Order to Rescind Transport Order

Cheri C. Copsey

BREF

CCDWONCP

Petitioner's Brief in Opposition to Motion for
Summary of Dismissal

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

CCBARCCR

Notice of Hearing (Status by Phone 06/04/2008
11:00 AM)'

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

CCTEELAL

Motion for Transport

Cheri C. Copsey

AFFD

TCWEATJB

Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin in Support of Second Cheri C. Copsey
Amended Petition and Affidavit for Post
Conviction Relief
00005

AFFD

Cheri C. Copsey

Cheri C. Copsey

Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin in Support of Second Cheri C. Copsey
Amended Petition for PC

Date: 12/8/2008
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Carlos Esquivel, Plainti vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

6/4/2008

MlSC

DCDANSEL

Supplemental Brief in Response to Petitioner's
Opoostion to State's Motion to Dismiss

DCHH

TCWEATJB

Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on
Cheri C. Copsey
06/04/2008 11:00 AM: District Court Hearing Helc
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Under 100 Pages

61612008

PROS

PRROOTSM

Prosecutor assigned Jean Fisher

711512008

COND

DCDANSEL

8/5/2008

RSPN

10/2812008

Cheri C. Copsey

STAT

DCDANSEL

Cheri C. Copsey
Order Conditionally Dismissing Second Amended Cheri C. Copsey
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
Petitioners Response to Order Conditionally
Cheri C. Copsey
Dismissing Second Amended Petition for Post
Conviction Relief
Order Dismissing Second Amended Petition for Cheri C. Copsey
Post Conviction Relief
STATUS CHANGED: Closed
Cheri C. Copsey

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Appealed To The Supreme Court

MOAF

CCTHIEBJ

ORDR

TCWEATJB

Motion & Affidavit To Appoint State Appellate
Cheri C. Copsey
Public Defender
Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender Cheri C. Copsey
on Direct Appeal

DCDANSEL

10/24/2008

Judge

Cheri C. Copsey

NO.
A.M

Dennis Benjamin
ISB #4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000
(208) 345-8274 (f)

I

FILG?)

,M.

I

y yw

A U ~2 Y 2W7
J. DAVID NAVAtlHO, Clerk.
By J. kAIiLE
DEPUTY

Appointed counsel for petitioner on appeal
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CARLOS ESQUIVEL,
NO. S P O T 050
Petitioner,

MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL

VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, moves this Court for an order appointing him coutlsel to
represent him in this post-conviction proceeding.
This motion is made pursuant to I.C.

19-4904 and the Court of Appeals's decision in

Esquivel v. State, 2007 Unpublished Decision No. 541 (August 3, 2007), which "reverse[d] in
part [this Court's] order dismissing Esquivel's application for post-conviction relief' and further
"remand[ing] the case to the district court for further proceedings, wherein the district court is
instructed to appoint counsel to assist Esquivel in pursuing his single, potentially valid claim."
Slip Op., at 8. (A copy of the unpublished opinion is attached as Exhibit A.) The Remittitur,
which was issued on August 28, 2007, ordered "that the District Court shall forthwith conlply

1

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

with the directive of the unpublished Opinion[.]" (A copy of the Remittitur is attached as Exhibit

Respectfully submitted this 29Ihday of August, 2007.

&- -

Dennis Benjamin
(Appointed Counsel on Appeal)
for Carlos Esquivel

2

MOTlON FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

00008

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I CERTIFY that on August
document to:

m,

I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing

mailed
hand delivered

-faxed
to:

Jean Fisher
Deputy Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Ada County Courthouse
Boise. ID 83702

-

Dennis ~ e n j & i n

3

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

AUG 0 6 2007
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 32689
)

2007 Unpublished Opinion No. 541

)

Filed: August 3,2007

v.

)

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
OPINION AND SHALL NOT
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

CARLOS ESQUIVEL,
Petitioner-Appellant,

Respondent.

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge.
Order summarily dismissing application for post-conviction relief, affirmed
part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Ralph R. Blount, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
PERRY, Chief Judge
Carlos Esquivel appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing his
application for post-conviction relief. Specifically, Esquivel challenges the district court's denial
of his request for appointment of counsel and the adequacy of the district court's notice of intent
to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Esquivel was charged with three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under the age o f '
sixteen, I.C.

5 18-1508, and one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen, I.C. 5

18-1506. At the completion of trial, a jury found him guilty of all charges. Prior to sentencing,
the district court ordered Esquivel to undergo a psychosexual evaluation to be conducted by a
psychologist.

The results of Esquivel's psychosexual evaluation were included in the

presentence investigation report (PSI) and considered by the district court at sentencing.
Esquivel was sentenced to concurrent unified terms of thirty years, with minimum periods of
confinement of fifteen years, for lewd conduct and a concurrent unified term of fifteen years,
with a minimum period of confinement of five years, for sexual abuse.

Esquivel filed an

I.C.R. 35 motion which was denied by the district court. On appeal, this Court affirmed
Esquivel's judgment of conviction, sentences, and the district court's denial of his Rule 35
motion in an unpublished opinion. State v. Esquivel, Docket No. 30424 (Ct. App. Dec. 2,2004).
Esquivel filed an application for post-conviction relief seeking a vacation of his judgment
of conviction and a new trial.

Esquivel's application alleged sixteen distinct claims of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel and one claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
Esquivel also requested that the district court appoint an attorney to represent him in his postconviction claims. The district court denied Esquivel's request for appointment of an attorney,
holding that his claims were frivolous and without merit. Esquivel then filed an amended
application for post-conviction relief with only six of the original claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel alleged. Esquivel also renewed his request for the appointment of an attorney. The
district court again denied Esquivel's request for an attorney.
The district court filed a notice of intent to dismiss Esquivel's application for postconviction relief and gave both Esquivel and the state twenty days to respond. Neither Esquivel
nor the state responded and, more than two months later, the district court dismissed Esquivel's
application. Esquivel appeals.
11.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature.

State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678,662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827,
830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1.323, 1326 (Ct.
App. 1992). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of
evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. $ 194907; Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.Zd 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1990). An application for
post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. An application must
contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a
complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be

verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits,
records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must
state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application. I.C.

5 19-4903. In

other words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting
its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal.
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative.
Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to I.C.
summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56.

5

19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of

Summary dismissal is permissible only when the

applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is
presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819
P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct.
App. 1988); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374, 376 (Ct. App. 1987). Summary
dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief may be appropriate, however, even where
the state does not controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not required to accept
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the
applicant's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App.
1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156,159,715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986).
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary
hearing, we determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions together with any affidavits on file; moreover, the court liberally construes the
facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894,
896,865 P.2d 985,987 (Ct. App. 1993).
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the postconviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct.
,

App. 1992). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show
that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the
deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho
3 13, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the
burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Aragon v. Stute, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish
prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760
P.2d at 1177.
111.

ANALYSIS
On appeal, Esquivel asserts the district court erred in denying his request for appointment
of counsel. Esquivel argues that two of his post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel
claims--counsel's failure to request a polygraph and an independent psychosexual evaluation-were valid and merited the assistance of counsel to pursue. Furthermore, Esquivel also argues
that the district court's notice of intent to dismiss did not address the grounds for the dismissal of
one of his claims.
A.

Appointment of Counsel

If a post-conviction applicant is unable to pay for the expenses of representation, the trial

court may appoint counsel to represent the applicant in preparing the application, in the trial
court and on appeal. I.C. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed
counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792,
102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). When a district court is presented with a request for appointed
counsel, the court must address this request before ruling on the substantive issues in the case.
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111; Fox v. State, 129 Idaho 881, 885, 934 P.2d
947, 951 (Ct. App. 1997). The district court abuses its discretion where it fails to determine
whether an applicant for post-conviction relief is entitled to court-appointed counsel before
denying the application on the merits. See Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112.
In determining whether to appoint counsel pursuant to Section 19-4904, the district court
should determine if the applicant is able to afford counsel and whether the situation is one in
which counsel should be appointed to assist the applicant. Id. In its analysis, the district court
should consider that applications filed by a pro se applicant may be conclusory and incomplete.
See id., at 792-93, 102 P.3d at 1111-12. Facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged
because they do not exist or because the pro se applicant does not know the essential elements of
a claim. Id Some claims are so patently fiivolous that they could not be developed into viable
claims even with the assistance of counsel. Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493, 95 P.3d 642,

644 (Ct. App. 2004). However, if an applicant alleges facts that raise the possibility of a valid
claim, the district court should appoint counsel in order to give the applicant an opportunity to
work with counsel and properly allege the necessary supporting facts. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at
793, 102 P.3d at 1112.

I.

Polygraph examination

Esquivel asserts the district court erred in denying his request for appointment of counsel
to assist him in his post-conviction claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to arrange
for him to undergo a polygraph examination. On appeal, Esquivel admits that the results of a
polygraph examination would not have been admissible at trial. Instead, Esquivel argues that a
favorable polygraph examination might have resulted in the state offering an acceptable plea
agreement or the sentencing court may have given him a lesser sentence.
Initially, we note that Esquivel's first application appears to indicate his claim is
challenging his trial counsel's failure to obtain a polygraph test to use at trial. In contrast, the
issues Esquivel raises on appeal clearly challenge his trial counsel's failure to obtain polygraph
results for potential use during pre-trial negotiations or at sentencing. Generally, issues not
raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192,
195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). However, Esquivel's amended application briefly mentions that
favorable polygraph results may have also been utilized at sentencing. Nowhere, though, does
Esquivel's amended petition challenge his trial counsel's efforts, or lack thereof, to obtain a plea
agreement. Accordingly, we now consider only the sentencing issues he raises on appeal as
related to the specific post-conviction claim of counsel's failure to arrange for Esquivel to take a
polygraph exam.
In reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, this Court has long adhered to the
proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on
appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 23 1, 233, 880
P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994). Not introducing the results of an already existing, favorable
polygraph examination at sentencing, in a child sexual abuse case, can be considered a tactical
decision as such defendants often receive harsher sentences for refusing responsibility. See
Fodge v. State, 125 Idaho 882,887,876 P.2d 164,169 (Ct. App. 1994).

Here, considering the substantial evidence against Esquivel, the record does not indicate
that the results of a polygraph test likely would have been favorable, or that the failure to obtain
such an examination prejudiced his sentencing. Even if Esquivel's trial counsel had obtained a
favorable polygraph examination of Esquivel, no facts are alleged in his application, or
established in the record, indicating such results would have had a positive effect on h s
sentencing. Moreover, even a favorable polygraph result could potentially have a negative effect
on Esquivel's sentencing if the district court chose to view such evidence, after a finding of guilt
at trial, as indicative of Esquivel refbsing to accept responsibility for his crimes.
Therefore, the decision whether to obtain a polygraph examination of Esquivel, after he
had been found guilty by the jury, was a tactical decision that cannot form the basis for a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Esquivel's application provided no facts that would raise the
possibility of a valid claim and, accordingly, the district court did not err in denying appointment
of counsel to assist him in pursuing this claim.
2.

Psychosexual evaluation

Esquivel asserts the district court erred in denying his request for appointment of counsel
to assist him in his post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
properly challenge the psychosexual evaluation used against him after Esquivel requested trial
counsel to do so. A psychosexual evaluation conducted for sentencing purposes is considered a
critical stage of the defendant's case. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837
(2006).

Therefore, a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel's advice regarding his

or her participation in an evaluation. Id. at 558-59, 149 P.3d at 837-38. Trial counsel's failure to
properly advise a defendant regarding his or her Fifth Amendment rights in submitting to a
psychosexual evaluation may amount to deficient performance. See id at 564, 149 P.3d at 839.
When there is a reasonable probability that the sentence would be different had the psychosexual
evaluation not been included, or had been more favorable to the defendant, a trial counsel's
deficient performance may also be prejudicial. See Wood, 132 Idaho at 101, 967 P.2d at 715;
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 565, 149 P.3d at 840.
Esquivel's application alleges facts indicating the possibility that his court-ordered
psychosexual evaluation was inadequately conducted and that he voiced his concerns about the
evaluation to his trial counsel. Esquivel's application, in essence, claims his triql counsel was
deficient for failing to either question the conduct of the expert who performed the evaluation or

request that a different expert conduct a new psychosexual evaluation. The record before this
Court on appeal demonstrates that the results of Esquivel's psychosexual evaluation were
considered by the district court in making its sentencing decision and was a factor contributing to
the length of his sentence.
Esquivel's application does not set forth all the elements necessary to succeed in an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, nor is his claim clearly or artfully worded. However, in
seeking appointment of counsel to assist him in pursuing a post-conviction claim, Esquivel does
not need to posit a complete claim in his application because it is understood that a pro se
applicant rarely has the skill or knowledge to do so. See Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-93, 102
P.3d at 1111-12. Instead, Esquivel's application needed only to allege facts that might possibly
give rise to a valid claim. See id. at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. While we offer no opinion on the
appropriateness
trial counsel's
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,... .i.. " of ,his
8 $1 ., .- ,
. conduct
-.' 3?2
recor&raises thepawfbfliryof a valid claim1Wo counsel's inaction regarding the psychosexual
,
. - .
" ,
'$"?*
evalu&an - ~ ~ h w T ! ~ \ m a ~ c 8 1 2 cthat
I u d&e*district
et
court erred in denying the request for
,-

)

,

;(

+

L

3

h'.

'?

-

I

totpmtr&.this.speatfi~post-convictionclaim. Accordingly, we reverse
appointmen&,af,cguns&
-L

the district court's summary dismissal and denial of counsel as to this claim. On remand, we
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B.

Notice of Intent to Dismiss

On appeal, Esquivel also argues that the district court's notice of intent to dismiss failed
to address the deficiencies in his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to arrange an
independent psychosexual evaluation. However, we have already concluded that the facts
alleged in Esquivel's application regarding this issue raised the possibility of a valid claim. As a
result, the district court erred in denying appointment of counsel to assist Esquivel, and we
remand for M e r proceedings on this claim alone. Therefore, we need not address this issue on
appeal.

rv.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in denying appointment of counsel to assist Esquivel in his
post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon counsel's failure to request
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Esquivel undergo a polygraph examination. Esquivel's application does, however, allege facts
which raise the possibility of a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim in regard to his
psychosexual evaluation. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Esquivel's request for
appointment of counsel to assist him in pursuing this claim. Accordingly, we affirm in part and
reverse in part the district court's order dismissing Esquivel's application for post-conviction
relief. Furthermore, we remand this case to the district court for futher proceedings, wherein the
district court is instructed to appoint counsel to assist Esquivel in pursing his single, potentially
valid claim. No costs or fees are awarded to either party on appeal.
Judge LANSING and Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCUR.
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Respondent.
TO:

NO. 32689

FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF ADA.

The Court having announced its unpublished Opinion in this cause August 3,
2007, which has now become final; therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District Court shall forthwith comply with
the directive of the unpublished Opinion, if any action is required.
DATE; this

z$

day of August, 2007.
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Ada County Clerk
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
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CARLOS ESQUIVEL,

NO. SPOT 0 5 0 m
Petitioner,

ORDER APPOINTING
COUNSEL

VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

The Court, having considered the Court of Appeals's decision in this case (Esquivel v.
State, 2007 Unpublished Opinion No. 541, issued on August 3, 2007) and the Remittitur of that
Court, issued on August 28,2007, it is hereby ordered that conflict counsel, as assigned by the
Ada County Public Defenders, be and hereby is appointed to represent the petitioner.

4Dated this 3

day of

% , 2007.
&+,
Hon. Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge

1

ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jean M. Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3 191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,
VS.

CARLOS ESQUIVEL,
Petitioner,

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
)
)

Case No. SPOT 0500561
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
RELEASE DEFENSE FILE TO
THE STATE FOR UPCPA
ACTION

COMES NOW, Jean M. Fisher, Deputy Ada County Prosecutor, and files this Motion

requesting the Court to Order the public defender's office to officially waive the attorney-client
privilege and to turn-over the original defense case file to the State for the underlying criminal
case in H0300476. There is a pending UPCPA action involving the single issue regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel in regard to the psychosexual evaluation.

Respondent's Motion for Release the Public Defender's File to the State(Esquive1 v.
State of Idaho, SPOT 0500516), Page 1

000~0

In order for the State to effectively prepare for this matter, the State needs to access to the
public defender's file and to open communication with the defense attorney, Eric Rolfsen, in this
matter.
Respectfully submitted this 24thday of October, 2007.

Deputy Ada County Prosecutor

Respondent's Motion for Release the Public Defender's File to the State(Esquive1 v.
State of Idaho, SPOT 0500516), Page 2

oclnz3.l

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this d d a y October 2007, I provided a true
and correct copy of the foregoing to: J. Layne Davis, Attorney at Law, 200 N. 4TH
ST., STE. 302, BOISE, ID 83702, by faxing to (208) 429-1 100 and then mailing via
United States mail, postage prepaid.

Respondent's Motion to Release the Public Defender's File to the State
(Esquivel v. State of Idaho, SPOT 0500561), Page 3
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jean M. Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3 191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,
VS.
CARLOS ESQUIVEL,
Petitioner,

1
1
)
)
)

1
1
)

Case No. SPOT 0500561
ORDER WAIVING
CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE
PUBLIC DEFENDER AND THE
CRIMINAL FILE IN H0300476

1
The Petitioner, having raised an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a postconviction relief action involving the petitioner's participation in a psychosexual evaluation, this
Court ORDERS that the public defender's criminal file in H0300476 be copied andlor made
available to the Ada County Prosecutor's Office. The Court orders that the attomeylclient

Order Waiving Confiidentiality (Esquivel v. State of Idaho, SPOT 0500561), Page 1

privilege is hereby waived as to the public defender's representation of Carlos Esquivel in all
matters relating to the H0300476 criminal case.
Dated this

13

Tr

hw

day of Ckbber, 2007.

GLtL-srr,
District Court Judge

Order Waiving Confidentiality (Esquivel v. State of Idaho, SPOT 0500561), Page 2

Layne Davis
DAVIS & WALKER
200 North 4thStreet, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 429- 1200
Facsimile: (208) 429-1 100
Idaho State Bar No. 4640

J.

DAVID NAVARAO, Clark
By J. EARLE
DmJrY

Conflict Counsel for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CARLOS ESQUIVEL,
Petitioner,
VS.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)

1
1

Case No. SPOT0500561

)

SECOND AMENDED PETITION
AND AFFIDAVIT FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF

1
1
)
)
)

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, by and through his attorney of record,
Layne Davis of Davis & Walker, and pursuant to Idaho Code $9 19-4903 and 19-4906, amends
the Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief filed on or about July 15,2005.
The proceeding in which the Petitioner was convicted is State of Idaho vs. Carlos
Esquivel, Ada County Case No. H0300476. The Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Post

Conviction Relief on or about August 15,2005, which was summarily dismissed. On January
23,2006, the Petitioner appealed the courts summary dismissal of the Petitioner's Amended Post
Conviction Petition.

SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 1

00025

The Court of Appeals issued its unpublished opinion #541 on August 8,2007, which
affirmed a portion of the court's Summary Dismissal, reversed the Dismissal as to one remaining
issue, and remanded back to the District Court for further proceedings.
This Second Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief addresses the sole issue of the
Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim with regard to the psychosexual evaluation
contained in the Presentence report, dated January 6,2004.
The Petitioner alleges the following grounds upon which the application is based:
1.

Ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that his trial

counsel's failure to properly advise him regarding his Fifth Amendment Rights in submitting to a
psychosexual evaluation amounted to deficient performance. A psychosexual evaluation
conducted for sentencing purposes is considered a critical stage of the Defendant's case. Estrada
vs. State 143 Idaho 558, 149#P.3d#833(2006). Petitioner asserts that he voiced his concerns

about the evaluation to his trial counsel, and his trial counsel failed to question the conduct of the
expert who performed the evaluation, to request a different expert to conduct a psychosexual
evaluation, independently of Doctor Robert Engle, or to advise Petitioner he could have simply
chosen not to participate at all in the evaluation.
The evaluation by Dr. Engle, among other things, indicates the Petitioner to not be a
candidate for outpatient sex offender treatment, in part because of the Petitioner's denial during
the examination, that he had sexually abused the alleged victim in the substantive case.
The Sentencing Court relied on the evaluation in part in its sentencing decision, and as a
result, trial counsel's deficient performance provides the basis for Petitioners application in this
instance.

2.

The conviction and its sentence is in violation of the Constitution of The United

States andlor the Constitution of the laws of The State of Idaho.
SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 2

C ~ l ) ~ Z ~

3.

Trial counsel's deficient performance, requires vacating the sentence in the

interest of justice.
4.

This Second Amended Petition is supported by the original Petition for Post

Conviction and First Amended Petition, previously on file, and is incorporated herein by
reference as if fully set forth herein.

DATED this

31

day of January, 2008.
DAVIS & WALKER

Lz&ne Davis
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner

SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

i
31

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of January, 2008, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Ada County Prosecutor
200 W. Front St., Rrn. 3191
Boise, ID 83702

[
[
[
[

1
1
1
1

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
FACSIMILE
OVERNIGHT MAIL

DAVIS & WALKER

lAi

~ a $ Davis
~ ~ n f l iCounsel
ct
for Petitioner

SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF

- Page 4
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NO.
A.M

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Jean M. Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3 191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CARLOS ESQUIVEL ,
Petitioner,
VS.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent

)

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

61

Case No. SPOT 0 5 0 0 m
Respondent's Answer to the
Second Amended Petition for Post
Conviction Relief

1. As to paragraph one, the State admits that defense counsel at trial did not advise the
petitioner of his Fifth Amendment Right regarding the psychosexual evaluation; The
State, however, denies that the failure to do so was so deficient as to change the outcome
of the petitioner's sentencing;
2. As to paragraph two, the State denies that the conviction and the sentence violated the
Constitution of the United States;
3. As to paragraph three, the State denies that there was such deficient performance as to
disrupt the original sentence;

4. The State denies that the second amended petition is supported by appropriate legal
documentation, affidavit or law to support post conviction relief.

State's Answer to Second Amended Motion for Post Conviction Relief
(SPOT0500561), Page 1

The State respectfully requests that this second motion for relief be summarily denied. The State
shall a brief in support of this motion for dismissal.

t lw

Respectfully submitted t h i d d a y of February, 2008.

bean M. Fisher
Deputy Ada County Prosecutor

State's Answer to Second Amended Motion for Post Conviction Relief
(SPOT0500561), Page 2

00030

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this @ day February 2008, I provided a true
and correct copy of the foregoing to: Layne Davis Attorney at Law, 200 North 4th
St., Ste. 302, Boise, ID 83702, by depositing in the United States mail, postage

prepaid.

State's Answer to Second Amended Motion for Post Conviction Relief
(SPOT0500561), Page 3

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. EARLE

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
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Jean M. Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3 191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTNCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CARLOS ESQUIVEL ,

1
Petitioner,
VS.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Case No. SPOT 0500

1
1
1

Respondent's Brief in Support of
Summary Dismissal

)

Respondent

1
1

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Jean M. Fisher, Deputy Ada County
Prosecutor, and does hereby provide this brief in support of the state's motion for summary
dismissal of Carlos Esquivel's second amended petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to
Idaho Code

19-4906(c).
I.
Factual And Procedural History

Esquivel was charged and convicted by a jury of three counts of lewd conduct with a minor
and one count of sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen. Before sentencing, he was ordered to
obtain a psychosexual evaluation for sentencing. The basic facts are as set forth by the Idaho

State's Brief in Support of Summary Dismissal (Esquivel, SPOT 0500516D)
4

9ocnz

Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion number 541 filed Augus 3,2007 under Docket number
32689.
On January 3 1,2008, Esquivel filed the instant second amended petition for postconviction relief. The state filed an answer on February 8, 2008 and a motion to take judicial
notice of the record, transcripts, and exhibits in the underlying criminal case. Presently, the state
has filed a motion for summary dismissal and this brief in support of the state's motion for
summary dismissal.

II.
Applicable Legal Standards

A.

General Standards

An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature.
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676,678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827,
830,452 P.2d 54,57 (1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct.
App. 1992). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary
civil action, however, an application must contain much more than "a short and plain statement
of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Martinez v. State, 126
Idaho 8 13, 8 16, 892 P.2d 488,491 (Ct. App. 1995). Rather, an application for post-conviction
relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and
affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the
application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application. I.C.

5

19-4903. Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of
evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. 4 194907; Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65,67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1990).

State's Brief in Support of Summary Dismissal (Esquivel, SPOT 05005161))
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The post-conviction petitioner must make factual allegations showing each essential
element of the claim, and a showing of admissible evidence must support those factual
allegations. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994); Drapeau v.
State, 103 Idaho 6 12,617,65 1 P.2d 546,65 1 (Ct. App. 1982); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822,
824, 702 P.2d 860, 862 (Ct. App. 1985). The district court may take judicial notice of the record
of the underlying criminal case. Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 739, 745 P.2d 758, 761 (Ct. App.
1987), affd 115 Idaho 315, 766 P.2d 785 (1988), overruled on other grounds State v. Guzman,
122 Idaho 98 1,842 P.2d 660 (1992).

B.

Lena1 Standards Applicable To Esquivel's Burden Of Making Out A Prima Facie Case Of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must demonstrate

both that (a) his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
(b) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88 (1984); LaBelle v.
State, 130 Idaho 115, 118, 937 P.2d 427,430 (Ct. App. 1997). "Because of the distorting effects
of hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong
presumption that counsel's performance was w i t h the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance -- that is, 'sound trial strategy."' Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243,
1248 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90); A r a ~ o nv. State, 114 Idaho 758,
760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). A petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel
"rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment" to establish that counsel's performance was "outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance." Claiboume v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir.1995)
(quoting, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).

State's Brief in Support of Summary Dismissal (Esquivel, SPOT 05005163))
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Thus, the first element - deficient performance - "requires a showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment."

Id.at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064,80 L. Ed. 2d at 693.

The second element

- prejudice - requires a showing that counsel's deficient performance actually had an adverse

effect on his defense; i.e., but for counsel's deficient performance, there was a reasonable
probability the outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693;
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). Regarding the second
element, Esquivel has the burden of showing that his trial counsels' deficient conduct "so
undermined the proper hctioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77,80, 844
P.2d 706, 709 (1992).
It is upon this second prong that Esquivel's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
fails. The State admits that the defense attorney in this case did not advise his client of the
client's Fifth Amendment Right to silence during the psychosexual examination. However, the
petitioner cannot assert any prejudice as a result of that failure by defense counsel.
Court and counsel have copies of the psychosexual evaluation previously prepared in this
case for the original sentencing. In reviewing the psychosexual evaluation, it is clear that the
petitioner did not cooperate with all of Dr. Engle's psychometric testing. On page 4 of his
evaluation, Dr. Engle states that the "Esquivel declined to complete any of the items on the
Multiphasic Sex Inventory for reasons detained under the "notification" portion of the present
evaluation." On the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory, Esquivel omitted to answer enough
questions that Dr. Engle was unable to validate any of the testing (page 5). On page 6, Dr. Engle
stated " Mr. Esquivel's reluctance to complete the psychological testing or to complete the
psychological testing in a valid manner has caused clinically significant information to be lost."

State's Brief in Support of Summary Dismissal (Esquivel, SPOT 0500516D)
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While Dr. Engle clearly indicates that sexual offender treatment is needed at "face" value, Dr.
Engle also informs the court in the psychosexual evaluation that he cannot determine if the
Esquivel is sexually obsessed, that he continually denied committing an offense, that he was
unwilling and uninterested in treatment (because he denied the offense).
The evaluation, in essence, was of very little value to the Court. When compared to the
sitting trier of fact, the judge had ability to judge the credibility of the witnesses, the State's case,
and weigh that against Esquivel's case. The trial judge in this case had the ability to assess
credibility and she acknowledged in her sentencing how important this actually was to her.
Beginning on page 265 of the sentencing transcript at lines 17 - 20, the Court states: "In
particular I've also relied very heavily on what happened in the trial itself, my own recollection
of it, my own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses in arriving at this decision." The
Court goes on to say that she found the child victim "quite credible" (p. 266,ll: 17). The Court
also found "Miss Witty's testimony to very credible. I don't find that some of the other
witnesses, for example, the defendant's wife, she may very well be credible, but what I also want
to point out is that these kinds of crime are crimes of secrecy. It is common for people who are
around an individual to know about the activities that may be taking place."
The Court went further in her analysis informing all partys that she watched the CARES
tape of the child witness and, again, she did not believe that the child was coached. (sentencing
transcript, p. 267)
As to the value of the psychosexual evaluation, it is clear that the court relied very little
on the evaluation. The Court notes at page 270 of the sentencing transcript that Esquivel was
uncooperative for the evaluation. However, her comments regarding the psychosexual
evaluation are dwarfed by the magnitude of consideration that she considered coming fi-om the
testimony of the case itself. While she mentions that the evaluation came back with a "moderate
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risk," she also acknowledges that Esquivel's refusal to cooperate was because he was
maintaining his innocence.
Sentencing a defendant is within the discretion of the trial judge. In this case, the
defendant faced potential life sentences on three counts of lewd conduct. Esquivel received
considerably less than the maximum allowable by the sentencingjudge. He cannot, with the
exception of pointing at the psychosexual evaluation, articulate any real prejudice in light of the
sentencingjudge's remarks regarding credibility of witnesses. The psychosexual evaluation
carried very little, if any value. Should the Court, however, conclude that the psychosexual
evaluation in this case was prejudicial, it is noteworthy to point out that Esquivel could be
resentenced to include life.
C.

Lena1 Standards Applicable To Summary Dismissal Under Idaho Code 6 19-

4906(c)

Idaho Code Section 19-4906(c) authorizes summary disposition of an application for
post-conviction relief. Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to I.C. 5 19- 4906 is the
procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. State v. LePa~ze,138 Idaho 803,
806,69 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Ct. App. 2003). I.C. 9 19-4906(c) provides:
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the
application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine
issue of material fact, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to
the requested relief. If such a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing
must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,763,819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App.
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1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146,754 P.2d 458,459 (Ct. App. 1988); Rarnirez v.
State, 113 Idaho 87,89, 741 P.2d 374,376 (Ct. App. 1987).
Conversely, the "application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence
supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." Goodwin v. State, 138
Idaho 269,272,61 P.3d 626,629 (Ct. App. 2002) review denied (2003); LePage, 138 Idaho at
807,69 P.3d at 1068 (citing Roman 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901). Follinus v. State, 127
Idaho 897, 908 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995) (Follinus's claim that his attorney had been ineffective
in failing to obtain a Franks hearing to contest the veracity of statements by the search warrant
affiant was properly summarily dismissed where the court found that trial counsel did obtain, in
effect, a Franks hearing at the suppression hearing); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 826,702 P.2d
860, 864 (Ct. App. 1985) (record of extradition proceedings disproved applicant's claim that he
was denied right to counsel in those proceedings). Allegations are insufficient for the grant of
relief when they do not justifir relief as a matter of law. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801
P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542,545,53 1 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975);
Reminaton v. State, 127 Idaho 443,446-47 901 P.2d 1344, 1347-48 (Ct. App. 1995); Dunlap v.
State, 126 Idaho 901, 906, 894 P.2d 134, 139 (Ct. App. 1995) (police affidavit was sufficient to
support issuance of search warrant, and defense attorney therefore was not deficient in failing to
move to suppress evidence on the ground that warrant was illegally issued).
Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle a
petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Roman, 125 Idaho at 647,873 P.2d at 901; Baruth v.
Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159,715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone, 108 Idaho at 826,702
P.2d at 864. If a petitioner fails to present evidence establishing an essential element on which
he bears the burden of proof, summary dismissal is appropriate. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588,
592, 861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993). Where petitioner's affidavits are based upon hearsay
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I
1

rather than personal knowledge, summary disposition without an evidentiary hearing is
appropriate. Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 844 P .2d 706 (1993).

D.

Standard Of Review Applied By The Appellate Court
Summary disposition under Idaho Code § 19-4906(b) is the procedural equivalent of

summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Rarnirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89,741 P.2d 374,376
(Ct. App. 1987). On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction application, the appellate court
will review the entire record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists which, if
resolved in petitioner's favor, would require that relief be granted. Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho
426,430,835 P.2d 661,665 (Ct. App. 1992). The appellate court will freely review this court's
application of the law. Nellsch, 122 Idaho at 430, 835 P.2d at 665.
The issues on appeal are, first, whether the petition alleges facts which, if true, would
entitle the applicant to relief. Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 373, 825 P.2d 94,96 (Ct. App.
1992). Second, whether those allegations are "supported by written statements from witnesses
who are able to give testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge, or [are] based upon
otherwise verifiable information." Drapeau, 103 Idaho at 6 17, 65 1 P.2d at 55 1. In this case,
Esquivel cannot provide facts that prove any prejudice on the ineffective assistance of counsel
based solely on the psychosexual evaluation issue. The Court gave it very little, if any, real
weight. This case was about credibility of witnesses. Esquivel denied what he was convicted
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and he continued to deny at the psychosexual evaluation and at sentencing.
The State respectfully requests that this second motion for relief be summarily denied.
I uRespectfully submitted this fday of February, 2008.

)&I"

kbM. Fisher

~ ; ~ Ada
u t County
~
Prosecutor
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

day February 2008,I provided a true

and correct copy of the foregoing to: Layne Davis Attorney at Law, 200 North 4th
St., Ste. 302, Boise, ID 83702, by depositing in the United States mail, postage
prepaid.

/
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jean M. Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
602 West Idaho Street
Boise, Idaho 83702-5954
Telephone: (208) 364-2121
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CARLOS ESQUIVEL,
Petitioner,
VS.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1

id

Case No. SPOT 05005lX@

MOTION T O DISMISS SECOND
AMENDED PETITION FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF

)

COMES NOW, Jean M. Fisher, Deputy Ada County Prosecutor, and motions this Court to
Dismiss the Second Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
The State respectfully submits that that the Petitioner's Amended Petition for Relief be dismissed.
DATED this 12" day of February, 2008.
GREG BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

/J&anM. Fisher
weputy Prosecuting Attorney

MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF (SPOT0500516D), Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this & % a y of February, 2008,I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief to
Layne Davis, Attorney at Law, 200 North 4" St., Ste. 302, Boise, ID 83702, through the
United States Mail, postage prepaid.

MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF (SPOT0500516D), Page 2
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Jean M. Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CARLOS ESQUIVEL,,

1

($1

1
Petitioner,

)

1

VS.

Case No. SPOT 05005MJI
(H0300476)

)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent

1

AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC ROLFSEN

)
)
)

Hereby this Affidavit, I, Eric Rolfsen, swear to the following contents:
1. I was the legal defense attorney for Carlos Esquivel in case number H0300476;
2. I was the legal representative for Carlos Esquivel for the entirety of the criminal
proceedings before Judge Cheri Copsey;
3. I represented Carlos Esquivel at a jury trial for multiple counts of lewd conduct with a
minor under sixteen pursuant to I.C. 18-1508 and a count of sexual abuse of a child
under sixteen pursuant to I.C. 18-1506;
4. My client was convicted at the jury trial;

mdavit

of Eric Rolfsen(SP0T 050051@, Page 1

5. My client was ordered to obtain a psychosexual evaluation prior to sentencing;
6 . 1 did not tell my client that he had a fifth amendment right not to participate in

that psychosexual evaluation;
7. My client denied committing any of the acts he was charged and convicted of and

maintained his innocence before the psychosexual evaluator.
4h
Respectfully submitted thisi2 day of February 2008.

n

Eric ~ z s e n

lb

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this L d a y of

IP,

. , Idaho,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /2 day of February, 2008, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to Layne Davis, Attorney at Law, 200 North 4thSt., Ste. 302, Boise, ID
83702, through the United States Mail, postage prepaid.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

11
6
7
8

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CARLOS ESQUIVEL,

11

11

Petitioner,
CASE NO. SPOT-0500561D
vs.

10

THE STATE OF IDAHO

11

SCHEDULING ORDER

Respondent.

12

13

14

After reviewing the Amended Petition and the State's response, the Court finds no

15

evidentiary hearing is necessary and, therefore, cancels the evidentiary hearing currently

16

scheduled. Eric Rolfsen, Esquivel's trial attorney, testified in his affidavit that he did not advise

17
18
19
20

1 I Esquivel of his constitutional right to remain silent during the S.A.N.E. evaluation. Therefore, the I

I11I

first prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel has been met; his representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Estrada v. State, 143 Id. 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2007);

11 att thews v. Slate, 136 Idaho 46,49,28 P.3d 387,390 (Ct.App. 2001); Aragon v.

State, 114 Idaho

21

758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). The remaining question, however, is whether Esquivel

22

was prejudiced by the this failure. The State moved to dismiss the Petition. The Court hereby

23
24
25

26
27

11 orders the following briefing schedule:

Esquivel shall file any response no later than April 1, 2008, and the State shall file any
reply no later than April 20,2008. If the parties request oral argument, they shall notice one.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 5" day of March 2008.

e&c*
Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge
13
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

3

I hereby certify that on this k%ay

4

of March 2008, I mailed (served) a true and correct

copy of the within instrument to:
6

7
g

LAYNEDAVIS
DAVIS AND WALKER
200 NORTH 4THSTREET, SUITE 302
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
IIGREG H. BOWER
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

IL

13
14

DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
200 W. FRONT STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702-5954

15
16

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
A
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26
27
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CASE NO.

Layne Davis
DAVIS & WALKER
200 North 4' Street, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 429-1200
Facsimile: (208) 429-1 100
Idaho State Bar No. 4640
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CARLOS ESQUIVEL,
Petitioner,
VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

1
)
)
)

1
1
1
1
1

Case No. SPOT-0500561D

PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY OF DISMISSAL

COMES NOW, the Petitioner, by and through his attorney of record, Layne Davis, with
the firm DAVIS & WALKER, and herby submits this brief in opposition of the State's Motion
for Summary Dismissal in the above entitled matter.
In light of the Trial Court's scheduling order, dated March 6,2008, which indicates that
the Petitioner has met his burden of the first prong of ineffective assistance of counsel (that
Petitioner's trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness) the
remaining question for the court is in determining whether the Petitioner was prejudiced by this
failure. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S., (1984).
In the State's brief in Support of Summary Dismissal, the State concedes that the Trial
Court relied on the Psychosexual Evaluation at the time of sentencing but that such reliance was
slight and that the court's consideration of the Psychosexual Evaluation carried very little value
PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY OF DISMISSAL - Page 1
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in the overall sentencing analysis conducted by the Trial Court.

In the final analysis, however,

the question is not how much, but whether, the Petitioner was prejudiced by trial counsel's
failure to advise Petitioner of his right to remain silent during the SANE evaluation.
The second part of the Strickland test is that the Petitioner must show his attorney's
deficient performance prejudiced him. Prejudice is shown if there is a "reasonable probability"
that Petitioner would have received a more favorable sentence had the Court not considered Dr.
Engle's report. Strickland, 687-688. Prejudice in this case is clear because the psychosexual
report was heavily relied upon by the State in recommending a lengthy prison sentence and, at
least in some way, the District Court in determining the sentence and in denying the Rule 35
motion.
At sentencing, the State argued that the evaluation showed Mr. Esquivel needed to be
punished severely. It stated:
[H]e continues to pose a more significant risk. He went to SANE and was
evaluated, although he was not particularly forthcoming in the SANE evaluation,
nor cooperative. He refused to answer MSI questions because he said he just
didn't like the questions and he thought that were just, in his words, sick or
perverted or something along those lines. He wouldn't appropriately answer the
Millon and so that test couldn't be scored. Unfortunately the examination doesn't
give the evaluation - doesn't give the Court as much information as you might
have liked, but that is the defendant's doing and he chose not to be cooperative
with that. It is interesting to note that Dr Engle . . . immediately detects that [Mr.
Esquivel] has an attitude of arrogance and an attitude that conveys clearly that he
is a victim of the instant offense, the criminal justice system, and the evaluation
process and that's reflected in Dr. Engle's evaluation of the defendant.

So looking at the risk, Judge, I think when Dr. Engle says he's at least a medium
risk to reoffend, that's in the best light given that the defendant doesn't finish out
on testing in this case. He's in total denial of what happened. . . .
Given all that, Your Honor, the State in evaluating this case knows that this is a
situation that calls out for a prison sentence. There are issues which involve
punishment and retribution. There are concerns that the defendant is not a
rehabilitation candidate at this time because he is in total denial[.]
PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY OF DISMISSAL - Page 2
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T (30424) pg. 256, In. 21 - pg. 258, In. 18.
The Court imposed the precise sentence recommended by the state and in doing so relied
upon Dr. Engle's report.
So when I look at all these facts and I look at the fact that Mr. Esquivel was really
not cooperative in that evaluation and I realize that there's an argument to be
made that a person does this if they are innocent of the charge, but I was
concerned when I saw that he didn't complete the part of the test and I don't buy
the whole idea that he was uncomfortable with answering questions about his own
sexual interests. He was aware that this was an important evaluation that the
Court was going to take into consideration in deciding what to do. I'm concerned
again with the guarded nature in which he answered some of the questions by the
evaluator. True it is that - it's not to be unexpected that an individual will get an
evaluation of a moderate level of risk because of denial, but the fact of the matter
is that the Court cannot ignore the fact that he was evaluated as having a moderate
level of risk. Although today he's indicated that he's interested in having and
attending the appropriate therapy, I want to note that it's easy to come into this
Court and make those kinds of assertions, but all along in his comments to the
evaluator he made it clear that he was not interested in having any sort of
treatment.

T (30424) pg. 270, In. 2-22.
Along these same lines, the Court relied upon Dr. Engle's evaluation in denying Mr.
Esquivel's Rule 35 motion. It wrote:
The S.A.N.E. evaluation stated Esquivel was at moderate risk to re-offend and the
evaluator opined he was not amenable to treatment because in part he denied an
offense occurred and was uninterested and unwilling to participate in sex offender
treatment.
CR (30424) 121;Memorandum Decision (denying Rule 35 Motion), pg. 4.
In light of the sentencing court's reliance upon Dr. Engle's report, it is clear that Mr.
Esquivel was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to obtain an independent psychosexual
evaluation or at least suppress the court-ordered one. The analysis of the reliance on the
psychosexual evaluation by the sentencing court should not be a quantitative one. In other words,
the question of prejudice is not resolved by the suggestion that the evaluation was not relied on
heavily by the court or that there are other factors in sentencing which would have led to the
same result. Given the state's sentencing argument, the court's reference to the evaluation in its
sentencing, and the given the court's imposition of the state's recommendation makes it clear
PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY OF DISMISSAL - Page 3
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that the Petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel. The
Petitioner is entitled to be sentenced without such prejudice.
For the reasons above, this Court should conclude that the Petitioner was prejudiced by
his trial counsel's failure to advise him of his Fifth Amendment privilege with regard to the
psychosexual evaluation, and should order a resentencing before a different judge.
Oral argument
DATED this

day of April, 2008.
DAVIS & WALKER

BY
Layne Davis
Conflict Counsel for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
day of April, 2008, I caused to be served a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front St., Ste. 3191
Boise, ID 83702

[

1
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[
[

1
1

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
FACSIMILE
OVERNIGHT MAIL

DAVIS & WALKER

Layne Davis
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Layne Davis
DAVIS & WALKER
200 North 4thStreet, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 429- 1200
Facsimile: (208) 429- 1100
Idaho State Bar No. 4640
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CARLOS ESQUIVEL,
Petitioner,

1
)
)
)

VS.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

1
1

Case No. SPOT0500561

AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS
BENJAMIN IN SUPPORT OF
SECOND AMENDED PETITION
AND AFFIDAVIT FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF

Dennis Benjamin, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby deposes and says:
1. I am over eighteen years of age and am competent to testify about the matters herein.

2. I was appointed counsel for the petitioner on appeal and am familiar with the files and
record in his criminal and post-conviction cases.
3. Based on my experience, observations and conversations with other attorneys who
handle post-conviction cases, I believe that the general practice in cases where there
has been a resentencing ordered pursuant to Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d
833 (2006), rehearing denied (2007), certiorari denied Idaho v. Estrudu, 128 S.Ct. 5 1
(2007) is to assign a new sentencing judge who has not been exposed to either the
improperly obtained evaluation or the presentence report.
4. In particular, I am currently the attorney of record in two criminal cases which are set
for resentencing due to successful post-conviction proceedings. In both cases the
District Court granted the post-conviction petition finding ineffective assistance of
counsel under Estrada v. State.

AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS BENJAMIN IN SUPPORT OF SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - Page 1
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5. In both cases, the post-conviction court sealed the psychosexual evaluation and the
Presentence Investigation Report and the sentencing was set before a District Judge
who had not read either of the sealed documents.
6. In the first case, State v. Estrada, Twin Falls Co. No. CR-2001-0544, the original
sentencing judge was the Honorable Nathan Higer and the post-conviction petition
was heard by the Honorable G. Richard Bevan. Upon remand from the Idaho
Supreme Court, Judge Bevan sealed the psychosexual evaluation and the presentence
report and assigned the case to the Honorable Randy J. Stoker for resentencing.
7. In the other case, State v. Herrera, Bannock Co. No. CR-2003-19657-FE, the
Honorable Ronald E. Bush was the original sentencing judge. However, the
resentencing was assigned to the Honorable David C. Nye by Administrative Judge
Peter McDermott.
8. In my opinion, it is in the best interests of judicial economy and fairness to have a
new sentencing judge assigned because it is difficult, if not impossible, for the
original sentencing court to put aside the material which has been obtained in
violation of Estrada and which has been or should be sealed. A reasonable person
might conclude that any sentence imposed by such a court has been affected, whether
consciously or unconsciously, by the improperly obtained material. Again, in my
opinion, because this common sense conclusion, whether true or false in any
particular case, undermines the public's confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the courts, the policy of assigning a new sentencing judge in such cases is wise and
fulfils the goals of Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2A.

This ends my affidavit.
Dennis Benjamin
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1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
of June, 2008, I caused to be served a tme
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

Ada County Prosecutor
200 W. Front St., Rm. 3191
Boise, ID 83702
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U.S. MAIL
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OVERNIGHT MAIL

DAVIS & WALKER
\
\.

Layne Davis
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner
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NO.

ardUEiiL.

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Jean M. Fisher
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
State of Idaho,

)
)

Respondent,
VS.
CARLOS ESQUIVEL,
Petitioner.

1
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. SPOT 0500561D
Supplemental Brief in Response
to Petitioner's Opposition to
State's Motion to Dismiss

COMES NOW, Jean M. Fisher, Deputy Ada County Prosecutor, and files this
supplemental brief in response to the opposition brief filed in this matter. The State herein
incorporates all other State briefs and filings within this supplemental response as well. In the
petitioner's brief, he suggests that there is a bright line analysis when determining if there was
any error at all by the sentencing judge and if there is, then he suggests that a bright line rule

STATE'S SUPPLEMENI'AL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
(Esquivel v. State of Idaho, SPOT0500651), Page 1
\
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articulating that the judge should be disqualified from the case and a new judge should be
appointed for re-sentencing. This is NOT the law.
Strickland requires that the petitioner must show with particularity how his
attorney's deficient performance prejudiced him. It is not enough to merely allege prejudice
without providing an adequate showing. Thus, the first element - deficient performance "requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." @. at 687,104 S. Ct. at 2064,80

L. Ed. 2d at 693. The second element - prejudice - requires a showing that counsel's deficient
performance actually had an adverse effect on his defense; i.e., but for counsel's deficient
performance, there was a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been
different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244
(Ct. App. 1999). Regarding the second element, Esquivel has the burden of showing that his trial
counsels' deficient conduct "so undermined the proper hctioning of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686;
v. State, 123 Idaho 77,80,844 P.2d 706,709 (1992).

As explained in Ivev v. State, 123 Idaho 77,80,844 P.2d 706,709 (1992), "The
constitutional requirement for effective assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a
defendant who can dredge up a long series of examples of how the case might have been tried
better."
In this case, Esquivel cannot satis@ the second prong of the Strickland test. Idaho has
long stood for the proposition that its sentencing judges are granted discretion in sentencing. In
State v. Pierce, 100 Idaho 57, 58,593 P.12d 392 (1979); State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922,926,
854 P.2d 265 (Ct.App. 1993), Courts have presumed that a sentencing court is able to ascertain
STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF I N SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
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the relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and material which was presented
to it during the sentencing process, to disregard the irrelevant and unreliable evidence, and to
properly weigh the remaining evidence which may be in conflict.
In this case, the district court judge heard all of the evidence presented to the jury in this
case. Additionally, she was able to review evidence that the jury did not see - the CARES
interview of the young child. As the sitting judge, she was able to see the case unfold and to
evaluate the State's case and compare it against the defendant's case. The judge is in a position
to also determine and assess credibility. In this case, she heard from the child, the child's family,
law enforcement and its investigation. She also heard the defendant's side of the case. She also
already knew that the defendant denied ever committing these offenses and acknowledged so at
the time of sentencing.
At the time of sentencing however the defendant no longer stands before the court with a
presumption of innocence cloaking him. He was found guilty by a jury. The judge did order the
defendant to participate in a psychosexual evaluation. However, the defendant was not
particularly cooperative and much of the value of the evaluation was lost. At sentencing, on
pages 265 through 270, the Court lists all of the factors that she considered at the time of
sentencing. In particular she spoke of 1. the CARES tape; 2. the consistency and manner in
which Angie was able to testify about where and how the assaults took place; 3. she specifically
rejected the defendant's theory that Angie was "coached"; 4. the judge saw and believed that
Angie was scared and will be affected by the abuse for years to come; 5. the court recognized that
he was guarded in the evaluation but rejected his reasoning for being guarded (that he was "not
comfortable with the sexual nature of the questions"); 6. the court recognized that the defendant
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himself said he was not interested in any treatment despite the jury's opinion; 7. his substance
abuse history.
Looking at all of that, it is clear that this court considered far more factors than merely the
psychosexual evaluation. The districtI court judge did "ascertain the relevancy and reliability of
the broad range of information and material which was presented to it during the sentencing
process, to disregard the irrelevant anh unreliable evidence, and to properly weigh the remaining
evidence which may be in conflict." State v. Pierce, 100 Idaho 57,58,593 P.2d 392 (1979).
C.

Legal Standards Applicable To Summarv Dismissal Under Idaho Code 4 19-4906(c)
Idaho Code Section 19-4906(c) authorizes summary disposition of an application for

post-conviction relief. Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to LC. $ 19- 4906 is the
procedural equivalent of surnrnary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803,
806,69 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Ct. App. 2003). LC. $ 19-4906(c) provides:
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the
application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine
issue of material fact, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to
the requested relief. If such a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing
must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763,s 19 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App.
1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146,754 P.2d 458,459 (Ct. App. 1988); Ramirez v.
State, 113 Idaho 87,89,741 P.2d 374,376 (Ct. App. 1987).
Conversely, the "application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence
supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." Goodwin v. State, 138
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Idaho 269,272,61 P.3d 626,629 (Ct. App. 2002) review denied (2003); LePane, 138 Idaho at
807,69 P.3d at 1068 (citing Roman 125 Idaho at 647,873 P.2d at 901). Follinus v. State, 127
Idaho 897,908 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995) (Follinus's claim that his attorney had been ineffective
in failing to obtain a Franlcs hearing to contest the veracity of statements by the search warrant
affiant was properly summarily dismissed where the court found that trial counsel did obtain, in
effect, a Franks hearing at the suppression hearing); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 826,702 P.2d
860,864 (Ct. App. 1985) (record of extradition proceedings disproved applicant's claim that he
was denied right to counsel in those proceedings). Allegations are insufficient for the grant of
relief when they do not justiQ relief as a matter of law. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801
P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542,545,53 1 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975);
Remington v. State, 127 Idaho 443,446-47 901 P.2d 1344, 1347-48 (Ct. App. 1995); Dunlap v.
State 126 Idaho 901,906,894 P.2d 134, 139 (Ct. App. 1995) (police affidavit was sufficient to

3-

support issuance of search warrant, and defense attorney therefore was not deficient in failing to
move to suppress evidence on the ground that warrant was illegally issued).
Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle a
petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901; Baruth v.
Gardner, 110 Idaho 156,159,715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone, 108 Idaho at 826,702
P.2d at 864. If a petitioner fails to present evidence establishing an essential element on which
he bears the burden of proof, summary dismissal is appropriate. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588,
592,861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993). Where petitioner's affidavits are based upon hearsay
rather than personal knowledge, summary disposition without an evidentiary hearing is
appropriate. Ivev v. State, 123 Idaho 77,844 P .2d 706 (1993).
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The State respecthlly requests that this claim be dismissed. In the alternative, if the
claim is not dismissed, the State respectfully requests that this court deny the relief sought in
obtaining a new judge for sentencing. To grant such relief would seriouslyjeopardize the State.
This is a case that went to jury trial where this court had the advantage of determining credibility
of a young child. This court also had a number of other family members to compare and contrast
the testimony of the child in determining the credibility.
Under the court decisions previously articulated [State v. Pierce, State v. Campbell, State
v. Bundy, State v. Holmes), the Court in its discretion is presumed to have the ability to sort
through relevant and unreliable evidence. Thls court did so in this case.
Dated this 3rdday of June, 2008.

I I

J&#I

-

P\ Fisher
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

I

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CARLOS ESQUIVEL,

1

Petitioner,

THE STATE OF IDAHO

I

Case No. SPOT 0500561
ORDER CONDITIONALLY
DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF

This Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is before the Court after the Court of Appeals in
an unpublished decision affirmed the Court, in part, and, reversed it in part, and remanded the case

l2

l3
l4
l5

16

(1 for huther proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals' ruling.

11

I

Upon remand, the Court appointed counsel on September 4, 2007, and held a status

conference on November 29, 2007. On January 31, 2008, Esquivel filed a Second Amended
I
11 Petition
alleging ineffective counsel in Case No. H0300476, based on his claim his counsel failed
1111 to advise him of h s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during his psychosexual evaluation. I
I
I I Esquivel supported his Second Amended Petition with an affidavit from his trial counsel in which

I

hls trial counsel testified that he did not advise Esquivel of his Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent. Esquivel also indicated no evidentiary hearing was necessary.
l9
20

11

11

The State moved to summarily dismiss Esquivel's Second Amended Petition on February
13, 2008, and the Court heard oral argument on June 4, 2008, and took the matter under
advisement on June 11,2008.
Having reviewed the Second Amended Petition and any evidence in a light most favorable
to Esquivel, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Esquivel is not entitled to post-conviction relief.
LC. 819-4906(2). The Court further finds there is no dispute of material fact and no purpose
would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore, by this order, the Court is indicating its
intention to dismiss Esquivel's Petition.

26
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II

Esquivel and the State may reply to the Court's notice of the proposed dismissal within 20
days.' In light of his reply, if any, or any failure to reply, the Court may order the Second
Amended Petition dismissed, grant leave to file an amended application or, direct that the

IIproceedings otherwise continue.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The State charged Esquivel with three counts of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under
Sixteen, Felony, I.C.

5 18-1508 and one count of Sexual Abuse of a Minor, Felony, I.C. tj 18-1506.

At trial, the young victim testified that the sexual abuse began when she was eight years
old and involved genital to genital contact, both vaginal and anal. She testified that it continued

11 until she was ten years old when she began to avoid seeing him.

11

Esquivel was her cousin's

step-father. Once the abuse began, it continued and was repeated. The victim described her
beddings as being wet after he would finish abusing her. She described in detail an attack that
occurred in Esquivel's bedroom and described the lubricant next to the bed.

To avoid the continued sexual abuse, she stopped visiting her cousin who was her best
11II fiiend. The
child was traumatized and will never be the same. Esquivel's actions violated her trust
and tore the entire family apart. Now sisters do not speak to one another. The child testified that
she did not tell anyone until she became convinced Esquivel would begin abusing her cousin, his
step-daughter.
At trial, the State attempted to introduce the CARES tape of the interview with the child

I I victim. At counsel's request, the Court viewed the tape and denied the State's request. The tape

II

demonstrated the consistencies in the child's testimony.
Esquivel testified at trial after being advised on the record of his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent and further advised that anything he said could be used against him. More
specifically, the Court advised him as follows:
THE COURT:
Now, you've indicated the defendant is going to testify. I
want to make sure - I would like to inquire directly of the defendant. I need to
make sure that you understand that you do have the right not to testify, but you also

I

"Where the state has filed a motion for summary disposition, but the court dismisses the application on grounds
different fiom those asserted in the state's motion, it does so on its own initiative and the court must provide twenty
days notice." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, -, 164 P.3d 798, 804 (2007) (citing Saykhamchone v. State, 127
Idaho 3 19,322,900 P.2d 795,798 (1995)).
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have the right to testify under our constitution and it is not for your attorney to
decide whether you testify. You need to understand that anything you say on the
stand can be used against you. So I need to inform you it is your decision to make
it and it - I'm going to ask you at this time is it your decision to testify today?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is.
Esquivel testified that he had not committed any of the acts testified to by the child. He
unequivocally denied responsibility for the crime.
The jury found Esquivel guilty on all counts. The Court ordered a pre-sentence report and
7

I( ordered a psychosexual evaluation. Esquivel's trial counsel testified on post-conviction that he did I
not advise Esquivel about his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during the psychosexual
evaluation.
Esquivel made no incriminating statements to the psychosexual evaluator and, in fact, he

9

continued to deny responsibility, just as he had at trial. The statements he made to the examiner

10
11
12
13

Ilwhich were reported in the psychosexual evaluation were consistent with those made at trial. He

11

did not complete a number of the tests causing the examiner to note that clinically significant

11 information had been lost. The examiner also noted that Esquivel's continuing denial and lack of I
interest in sex offender treatment made him unacceptable for out-patient treatment. Based on these

l4

factors, the examiner opined that Esquivel was at a moderate risk to re-offend.
As Esquivel's trial attorney correctly noted at sentencing, when a defendant who has been

11 found guilty of a sex offense continues to maintain innocence, the psychosexual examiner will
17

l8

II

11

always conclude that the offender is at moderate risk to reoffend because he is not amenable to

I I treatment.

1
~
I

At the outset of the Court's pronouncement of sentence, the Court stated as follows:
In particular, I've also relied very heavily on what happened in the trial
itself, my own recollection of it, my own assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses in arriving at this decision. . . .
I want to make it clear that I sat through this trial. I also observed the
CARES tape at the request of both counsel because there was a request to have the
CARES tape introduced at some point in the trial which I denied, and what I found
is that - I would make a specific finding that I found the child victim in this case
quite credible.

(11I
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*

11 The Court continued for some time detailing the testimony it heard and why that testimony

1 I suggested the child's testimony was credible and Esquivel's was not. See Transcript pp. 266-269.

1

I
I

For example, the Court stated as follows:
There were a couple of things that I found interesting. I know that the Defendant
claims in this case the child in his view was coached, but in listening to her
testimony both here in court and on the CARES tape, there were a couple of things
that struck me. First, I noticed - that there was consistency, but it wasn't
consistency like you see with someone who was coached. In my private practice I
observed children who have been coached and one of the things that I noticed was
that they repeat the exact same words over and over again. And, furthermore, the
other things that I have noticed with children who have been coached is generally
they are coached to use a much more sophisticated set of words than I saw that
Angie used. The words she used were the words of a young child and in many ways
a child, even though she was older at the time she was testifying, they were the
words of a child who is fairly - clear to the Court fairly unsophisticated. What I
found particularly important is, as the prosecutor pointed out, she credibly
described ejaculate. She described it as a wet bed. Now, if she were being coached,
she would have described it differently and I think it is something that the jury
picked up on. It's certainly something that I picked up on in listening to her. She
did not seem to know what it was, but she described pretty accurately what it would
be like if there was ejaculate on the bed.
The Court carefully observed how consistent the child's testimony was, finding no evidence to

14

l5

11

suggest she had been coached. In particular, the Court noted that the child was able to describe the
lubricant Esquivel used and where it was in his bedroom. The Court observed:
Furthermore, I noticed that while the majority of the times that she said that
she was sexually assaulted occurred in the one bedroom, there was one incident
which she described in the master bedroom. I found that rather significant because
the description in that case was significantly different. She was able to describe
where the lubricant was kept, something a child normally would not even know
about in going into a room unless she's seen someone take it down and use it in a
specific way. Children, and, quite frankly, even I as an adult am not observant
enough to notice when someone has lubricant in their bedroom, but she was able to
describe that and describe how it was used.

22

11

The Court also found that the child's difficulty in describing anatomical parts was consistent with
her age and suggested she had not been coached, contrary to Esquive17sclaims.
When I looked at all those things, I came to the conclusion that contrary to
what the Defendant says, this is not a child who's -who has been coached. This
was a child who was, I think, credibly testifying to what she observed and as I
indicated, she didn't really waiver too much in what she was describing and she had
difficulty in describing the anatomical parts which I found to be interesting, too.
ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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The Court observed the real fear that the child victim experienced and noted that her

manner of disclosure was consistent with the typical way in which these kinds of crimes are

discovered. The Court stated as follows:

I thought, again, her testimony was quite - was quite understandable and when I
looked at the CARES tape, it was interesting, again, that she testified there that she
was very - she was fearful for Marissa [her cousin] and that in part this is what
caused her to come forward. I also found that the way in which the report came
out, a spontaneous report at a friend's house with a person with whom she felt
comfortable, is a fairly typical way things like this would come out and she made it
clear it was not something she wanted to do, she didn't plan it, and she didn't report
to her adoptive mother, instead she reported to a friend, and a friend, like I said, that
she felt comfortable with. She was obviously uncomfortable discussing it with her
adoptive mother and I think in listening to her, that she. was - it seemed to me
anyway that she was concerned about the impact because she's not stupid, she's a
very bright young person, the impact this potentially was going to have on her
family.

II( 1 family.The Court also discussed the impact this crime would have on the victim and on her

l1

In looking at what she has written and what she testified to, it is clear that
she is still scared. This has impacted her in ways that will come out and unfold
over the years. She has been changed forever. Hopefully she will survive this and
become a stronger person. But let's make no bones about it, this is a young girl
whose life has been changed forever and I would suggest that this entire family's
life has been changed forever. It was an extreme violation of the child's trust and
it's the result of a series and continual bad choices that I believe were made on the
part of the Defendant.
The Court also noted that while Esquivel's lack of cooperation with the psychosexual

11
be consistent with someone who was innocent of the charges, his continued denial
treatment and rehabilitation problematic. The Court stated: "I will also note that I did take
I1made
account that his lack of amenability to treatment and also his clear use of illegal substances"
11IIinto
including heroin.

l8examiner could

l9
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22
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Given all of this, this Court imposed a thirty (30) year aggregate sentence with fifteen (15)
year(s) fixed and fifteen (15) year(s) indeterminate on each of the three counts of Lewd Conduct
with a Minor Under Sixteen. On the Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen, the Court

24

11 imposed fifteen (1 5) years aggregate with five (5) years fixed and ten (10) years indeterminate. All

25

I11

II

sentences were to run concurrently.
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Esquivel moved the Court to reconsider, and the Court denied his Motion. Esquivel
appealed and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's verdict and the Court's sentence in an
unpublished opinion.
On July 15, 2005, Esquivel, filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief, claiming ineffective
trial counsel based on several allegations. On December 12, 2005, after numerous motions, the
Court dismissed his Amended Petition and Esquivel appealed. On August 3, 2007, in an
unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals affirrned the Court, in part, and, reversed it in part,
remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals' ruling. The Court
7

of Appeals instructed this Court to appoint counsel to "assist Esquivel in pursuing the
post-conviction claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to arrange an independent
psychosexual evaluation or otherwise mitigate the effects of the court-ordered evaluation."
The Court appointed counsel to pursue the only remaining claim, ". . . that his counsel was
l1

12

l3
l4

15

16

l7

in failing to arrange an independent psychosexual evaluation or otherwise mitigate the
IIineffective
effects of the court-ordered evaluation," as provided by the Court of Appeals decision. Esquivel

11
11

filed a Second Amended Petition and on remand, in addition to claiming his counsel ineffective
for failing to question the conduct of the exam or to request a different expert to conduct an
independent examination, he now asserts for the first time that his counsel was ineffective because

(1 he failed to advise Petitioner that he could simply chosen not to participate at all in the evaluation.
abandoned his claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to question the
11 conductEsquivel
of the psychosexual evaluation or to request a different expert to conduct an independent
11 examination,
because he presented no argument or evidence regarding these claims to the Court.
ANALYSIS
A petition for Post Conviction Relief can be filed at any time within one year from the
expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following appeal,
which ever is later. I.C. 919-4902. In this case, Esquivel was sentenced on January 13,2004. The
Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence on December 3, 2004, and filed the Remittitur March 2,
2005. Esquivel timely filed his post-conviction Petition on July 13,2005.
Esquivel appealed the Court's decision dismissing his Amended Petition and on August 3,

24

2007, in an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court, in part, and, reversed it
26
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in part, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals' ruling. In
1

particular, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
Esquivel's application, in essence, claims his trial counsel was deficient for failing
to either question the conduct of the expert who performed the evaluation or request
a different expert conduct a new psychosexual evaluation. . . .
While we offer no opinion on the appropriateness of his trial counsel's conduct, the
facts alleged by Esquivel, combined with the record, raises the possibility of a valid
claim as to counsel's inaction regarding the psychosexual evaluation. . . . on
remand, we instruct the district court to appoint counsel to assist Esquivel in
pursuing the post-conviction claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to
arrange an independent psychosexual evaluation or otherwise mitigate the effects of
the court-ordered evaluation.

1 I (Emphasis in the opinion.)

lo

1111

Esquivel filed a Second Amended Petition and on remand, in addition to claiming his
counsel ineffective for failing to question the conduct of the exam or to request a different expert
to conduct an independent examination, he now asserts for the first time that his counsel was
ineffective because he failed

. . . to advise Petitioner he have could simply chosen not to participate at all in the
evaluation.
The evaluation by Dr. Engle, among other things, indicates the Petitioner to
not be a candidate for outpatient sex offender treatment, in part because of the
Petitioner's denial during the examination, that he had sexually abused the alleged
victim in the substantive case.
Esquivel relied on Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 563, 149 P.3d 833, 838 (2006), decided after

l8
l9

20
21

22

11

this Court's decision dismissing his Amended Petition. Esquivel supported his Second Amended
Petition with an affidavit from his trial counsel in which his trial counsel testified that he did not

11 advise Esquivel of his Fifih Amendment right to remain silent during the psychosexual evaluation.

(1

Esquivel also indicated no evidentiary hearing was necessary
The State moved to summarily dismiss Esquivel's Second Amended Petition on February
13, 2008, and filed additional argument on June 4, 2008. Esquivel filed argument on April 7,
2008. The Court heard oral argument on June 4,2008, and took the matter under advisement.
An application for post-conviction relief is in the nature of a civil proceeding, entirely

distinct from the underlying criminal proceeding. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 798, 25 P.3d
25

110, 1 11 (2001). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary
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civil action, however, because an application must contain much more than "a short and plain
statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Hernandez v.
State, 133 Idaho 794, 797,992 P.2d 789, 792 (Ct.App. 1999). The application must present or be
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject
to dismissal. Id. Finally, a petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claims are based. I.C.R. 5 7 ( ~ ) . ~

In this case, Esquivel's claim is ineffective counsel. Esquivel does not claim the sentence
imposed was illegal or that there were any grounds to suppress evidence.
A.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an applicant for post-conviction
relief must demonstrate (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Estrada v.
State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006).
First, to establish a deficiency, Esquivel has the burden of showing that his attorney's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Matthews v. State, 136 Idaho
46, 49, 28 P.3d 387, 390 (Ct.App. 2001); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174,
1176 (1988). As the Estrada court held, an attorney's performance falls below the objective
standard of reasonableness and is, thus, deficient if he or she fails to inform his client of the right
to remain silent or right to not participate in a court ordered psychosexual evaluation. Estrada, 143
Idaho at 564, 149 P.3d at 839. Esquivel's attorney testified he did not inform Esquivel of his right
to remain silent during the psychosexual evaluation. Thus, Esquivel has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that his attorney's advice, or lack of advice, was deficient. That
does not end the inquiry. The Estrada court did not change the requirement that Esquivel prove he
was prejudiced by the deficient advice.
Second, in order to succeed on post-conviction, Esquivel must show, bv a preponderance
of the evidence, that he was prejudiced by his attorney's deficiency or that the sentence would
have been different. Strickland, 466 U. S. at 69 1-92; Ramirez v. State, 119 Idaho 1037, 1041, 8 12

2

I.C.R. 57(c). Burden of Proof. The petitioner shall have the burden of proving the petitioner's grounds for relief by a
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P.2d 751, 755 (Ct.App. 1991). "To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable
probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have
been different." GiZpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 (2002) (quoting
Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 282, 32 P.3d 672, 674 (Ct.App.2001)). In order to properly
consider his claim, the Court must analyze Estrada and compare the facts in Estrada to those here.

B.

Esquivel cannot show the requisite prejudice.

The Idaho Supreme Court in Estrada recognized that prior to sentencing, the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to counsel apply to
psychosexual evaluations ordered by the court to be conducted prior to sentencing. Estrada, 143
Idaho at 563-64, 149 P.3d at 838-89. An attorney's performance falls below the objective standard
of reasonableness and is, thus, deficient if he or she fails to inform the client of the right to remain
silent or right to not participate in a court ordered psychosexual evaluation. Estrada, 143 Idaho at
564, 149 P.3d at 839.
However, the Supreme Court did not change the rule that once a defendant proves the
attorney failed to properly advise the defendant, the defendant must still prove by a preponderance
of the evidence "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 565, 149 P.3d at 840 (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694). "[Rleasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Id.
The facts in Estrada are important. In Estrada, unlike this case, the defendant pled guilty,
thus admitting responsibility. Esquivel, on the other hand, was found guilty after a jury trial in
which he testified repeatedly that he was innocent after being properly advised of his right to
remain silent.
Moreover, Estrada was initially uncooperative in the psychosexual evaluation and, in fact,
he wrote to the district court, asserting that the evaluation was unnecessary and caused a frustrating
delay in his sentencing. Estrada's attorney responded by writing a letter to Estrada advising him
that the evaluation was not a delay tactic, but "must be completed before sentencing." The attorney

preponderance of the evidence.
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also commented, "I want every single good piece of evidence that I can get my hands on to be able
to argue at your sentencing." Based on the letter, Estrada decided to participate in the evaluation.
Later, however, Estrada again became uncooperative and failed to complete certain
evaluation forms, which prompted the evaluator to contact Estrada's attorney to relay Estrada's
refusal to cooperate. The attorney sent Estrada another letter, in which he noted that the evaluation
was ordered by the district court. The attorney wrote, "We would not want the judge to consider
your lack of cooperation to mean that you are not willing to comply with court orders."
Thereafter, Estrada participated in the evaluation, which took place in the county jail. The
evaluation was filed with the district court and included a number of unfavorable and derogatory
comments about Estrada, including references to his potential for future violent actions.
Unlike Estrada, Esquivel never cooperated in his psychosexual evaluation. He refused to
complete psychometric testing making the evaluator conclude that "clinically significant
information had been lost." He maintained his innocence throughout the testing, made no
incriminating statements and, in fact, the reported statements in the evaluation are consistent with
those he made at trial.
While in Estrada the sentencing judge3 made specific, repeated references to the
psychosexual evaluation and its finding that Estrada was a violent person and clearly relied on it in
arriving at the sentence, that did not happen in this case. In this case, the only reason this Court
discussed the psychosexual evaluation at all was because the Court had ordered the evaluation.
This Court, at sentencing, only noted several times that Esquivel continued to maintain his
innocence during the psychosexual evaluation causing the evaluator to conclude that he was not
amenable to treatment placing him at moderate risk to reoffend. However, the Court already knew
he was not amenable to rehabilitation, because he denied culpability at trial. The psychosexual
evaluation itself added no new information to what this Court already knew based on Esquivel's
testimony at trial. In fact, his lack of participation in the psychosexual evaluation was predictable

3

The judge who decided the post-conviction petition in Estrada was a different judge. Therefore, any findings by the
post-conviction judge were not based on personal knowledge, unlike in this case.

1I

I
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given his trial testimony.4 In view of Esquivel's testimony, there is nothing in the psychosexual
evaluation that could have affected the Court's sentence.
While the Court of Appeals suggests in its decision that the mention5 of the psychosexual
evaluation implied that the Court relied on the report, that is not the case. This Court determined
Esquivel's sentence based on the testimony he gave and the evidence produced at trial and not on
the psychosexual evaluation. The psychosexual evaluation did not increase or reduce his sentence.
Esquivel did not receive a different sentence, either enhanced

reduced, based on his refusal to

cooperate in the psychosexual evaluation or because of its contents. It was his failure to accept
responsibility that demonstrated rehabilitation was unlikely.
It is well established that Idaho trial courts may consider a defendant's failure to accept
responsibility in determining whether rehabilitation efforts would be fruitful when imposing
sentence. See State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 494, 988 P.2d 715, 720 (Ct.App.1999); State v.
Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 73, 951 P.2d 1288, 1300 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Wheeler, 129 Idaho 735,
932 P.2d 363 (Ct.App.1997); State v. Smith, 127 Idaho 632, 903 P.2d 1329 (Ct.App. 1995); State

12

l3

l4
15

l6
l7

11
11

II

v. Fertig, 126 Idaho 364, 883 P.2d 722 (Ct.App.1994); State v. Nooner, 114 Idaho 654, 656, 759

P.2d 945, 947 (Ct.App.1988). A trial court may consider the failure to take responsibility for
crimes committed in considering the defendant's potential for rehabilitation. See Murphy, 133
Idaho at 494,988 P.2d at 720.

In reviewing the record, it is clear that this Court's references to the psychosexual
I1evaluation
to its conclusion regarding his amenability to treatment and rehabilitation,
11 a matter longwereheldlimited
to be appropriate to sentencing, and a conclusion clearly predicted by his own

18

11
11

testimony at trial. Therefore, Esquivel cannot establish that this Court's exercise of its discretion
in sentencing and in considering his lack of amenability to treatment was caused by any violation
of his fifth amendment rights; he cannot prove prejudice, the second prong of Strickland.

4

Following this trial, the Court no longer orders psychosexual evaluations where the defendant testifies that he is
innocent, because the result is predictable, just as Esquivel's attorney opined at Esquivel's sentencing.

5

At sentencing trial courts frequently identify those things the court has read or reviewed. That does not mean,
however, those items were factors in the sentence. For example, the trial court may read and consider the numerous
letters received in support of a defendant or letters from victims but that does not mean those letters have great impact
on the sentence.
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Likewise, if Esquivel had actually incriminated himself by making unwmed statements
during the psychosexual evaluation that caused the Court to learn something it did not already
know, the result may have been different on post-conviction. However, the fact is Esquivel made
no incriminating statements and the Court learned nothing it did not already know; Esquivel
proclaimed his innocence and did not cooperate in the psychosexual evaluation. He was not
prejudiced by his counsel's actions. Therefore, the Court finds Esquivel cannot establish a
reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different as required by Strickland.

CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the Second Amended Petition and any evidence in a light most favorable
to Esquivel, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Esquivel is not entitled to post-conviction relief.
I.C. $ 1 9 - 4 9 0 6 ( 2 ) .

The Court further finds there is no dispute of material fact and no purpose

would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore, by this order, the Court is indicating its
intention to dismiss Esquivel's Petition.
Esquivel and the State may reply to the Court's notice of the proposed dismissal within 20
days. In light of his reply, if any, or any failure to reply, the Court may order the Second Amended
Petition dismissed, grant leave to file an amended application or, direct that the proceedings
otherwise continue.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 15th day of July 2008.

Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge

1)I I
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I, I. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do her by certify that on July
2008 1
S E ~ D
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the ORDER ISMISSI G ~ M E N D E DPETITION

g~K~m~g

FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the
attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows:

GREG H. BOWER
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
JEAN FISHER
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
200 W. FRONT STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702-5954
LAYNE DAVIS
DAVIS & WALKER
200 NORTH 4THSTREET, SUITE 302
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
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J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

15
16

Date:
17
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20
21
22

23

24
25
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ORICElVAL

Layne Davis
DAVIS & WALKER
200 North 4thStreet, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 429-1 200
Facsimile: (208) 429- 1100
Idaho State Bar No. 4640

NO.
$,

,.",

3
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DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY ,OF ADA

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Respondent.

1

Petitioner,
VS.

Sv O r
Case No. CV PC 0500561
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO
ORDER CONDITIONALLY
DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED
PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

)

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, by and through his attorney of record,
Layne Davis, of the firm Davis & Walker, conflict counsel for the Ada County Public
Defender's Office, and hereby responds to the Court's Order Conditionally Dismissing Second
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, dated July 15,2008.
The Petitioner, for the sake of clarity and for preservation of the record, hereby adopts all
prior pleadings and arguments advanced by the Petitioner in support of the Petition for PostConviction Relief, and maintains his position that he is entitled to be re-sentenced before a
different judge, based on the claims made in the Petition.
DATED this

54 day o

d

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By P.BOURNE

Conflict Counsel for Petitioner

CARLOS ESQUIVEL,

O

f m 8 .
DAVIS & WALKER
BY
Layne Davis
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner

PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

oon1rs3

+

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A

?st-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of&O08,1
caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
200 W. Front St., Rm. 3191
Boise, ID 83702

[

1

@d@
[ 1

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
FACSIMILE
OVERNIGHT MAIL

DAVIS & WALKER

BY

w

Layne Davis
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

I

Petitioner,

I

Defendant.

Case No. SPOT 0500561
ORDER DISMISSING
SECOND AMENDED PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

I

This Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is before the Court after the Court of Appeals in
an unpublished decision affirmed the Court, in part, and, reversed it in part, and remanded the case

for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals' ruling.
Upon remand, the Court appointed counsel on September 4, 2007, and held a status
conference on November 29, 2007. On January 31, 2008, Esquivel filed a Second Amended
Petition alleging ineffective counsel in Case No. H0300476, based on his claim that his counsel
failed to advise him of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during his psychosexual
evaluation. Esquivel supported his Second Amended Petition with an affidavit from his trial
counsel in which his trial counsel testified that he did not advise Esquivel of his Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent. Esquivel also indicated no evidentiary hearing was necessary.
The State moved to summarily dismiss Esquivel's Second Amended Petition on February
13,2008, the Court heard oral argument on June 4,2008, and took the matter under advisement on
June 11,2008. On July 15,2008, the Court conditionally dismissed Esquivel's Second Amended
Petition and gave all parties twenty days to respond. Esquivel replied on August 5,2008.
Having reviewed the Second Amended Petition and any evidence in a light most favorable
to Esquivel, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Esquivel is not entitled to post-conviction relief.
LC. $19-4906(2). The Court further finds there is no dispute of material fact and no purpose

I
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ooosl:

1

1

11

would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore, the Court dismisses Esquivel's Second

II Amended Petition.

4

11
11II

Sixteen, Felony, I.C. $ 18-1508 and one count of Sexual Abuse of a Minor, Felony, I.C. $ 18-1506.

5

II

At trial, the young victim testified that the sexual abuse began when she was eight years

6

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The State charged Esquivel with three counts of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under

I

old and involved genital to genital contact, both vaginal and anal. She testified that it continued
until she was ten years old when she began to avoid seeing Esquivel. Esquivel was her cousin's

7

step-father. Once the abuse began, it continued and was repeated. The victim described her
8

beddings as being wet after he would finish abusing her. She described in detail an attack that

9

occurred in Esquivel's bedroom and described the lubricant next to the bed.

10

To avoid the continued sexual abuse, she stopped visiting her cousin who was her best

11

fiiend. The child was traumatized and will never be the same. Esquivel's actions violated her trust
and tore the entire family apart. Now sisters do not speak to one another. The child testified that

12

11
l4

15

l6

l7
18

she did not tell anyone until she became convinced Esquivel would begin abusing her cousin, his
step-daughter.

the State attempted to introduce the CARES tape of the interview with the child
1111 victim. AtAttrial,
counsel's request, the Court viewed the tape and denied the State's request. The tape

11

demonstrated the consistencies in the child's testimony.

testified at trial after being advised on the record of his Fifth Amendment right to
1111 remain Esquivel
silent and M h e r advised that anything he said could be used against him. More

II specifically, the Court advised him as follows:

THE COURT:
Now, you've indicated the defendant is going to testify. I
want to make sure - I would like to inquire directly of the defendant. I need to
make sure that you understand that you do have the right not to testify, but you also
have the right to testify under our constitution and it is not for your attorney to
decide whether you testify. You need to understand that anything you say on the
stand can be used against you. So I need to inform you it is your decision to make
it and it - I'm going to ask you at this time is it your decision to testifl today?

II
24

25

1111

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is.
Esquivel testified that he had not committed any of the acts testified to by' the child. He
unequivocally denied responsibility for the crime.
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The jury found Esquivel guilty on all counts. The Court ordered a pre-sentence report and

IIordered a psychosexual evaluation. Esquivel's trial counsel testified on post-conviction that he did

11

11
4

6

not advise Esquivel about his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during the psychosexual
evaluation.

made no incriminating statements to the psychosexual evaluator and, in fact, he
111 continuedEsquivel
to deny responsibility, just as he had at trial. The statements he made to the examiner
11 which were reported in the psychosexual evaluation were consistent with those made at trial. He
((did not complete a number of the tests causing the examiner to note that clinically significant

7
'

II information had been lost. The examiner also noted that Esquivel's continuing denial and lack of

1

interest in sex offender treatment made him unacceptable for out-patient treatment. Based on these

11 factors, the examiner opined that Esquivel was at a moderate risk to re-offend.
lo
l1

12

l3

14

11
II11

1

16
17

18

21

found guilty of a sex offense continues to maintain innocence, the psychosexual examiner will
always conclude that the offender is at moderate risk to reoffend because he is not amenable to

11 treatment.

15

20

As Esquivel's trial attorney correctly noted at sentencing, when a defendant who has been

At the outset of the Court's pronouncement of sentence, the Court stated as follows:
In particular, I've also relied very heavily on what happened in the trial
itself, my own recollection of it, my own assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses in arriving at this decision. . . .

I want to make it clear that I sat through this trial. I also observed the
CARES tape at the request of both counsel because there was a request to have the
CARES tape introduced at some point in the trial which I denied, and what I found
is that - I would make a specific finding that I found the child victim in this case
quite credible.

11

The Court continued for some time detailing the testimony it heard and why that testimony

II

For example, the Court stated as follows:

11 suggested the child's testimony was credible and Esquivel's was not. See Transcript pp. 266-269.
There were a couple of things that I found interesting. I know that the Defendant
claims in this case the child in his view was coached, but in listening to her
testimony both here in court and on the CARES tape, there were a couple of things
that struck me. First, I noticed - that there was consistency, but it wasn't
consistency like you see with someone who was coached. In my private practice I
observed children who have been coached and one of the things that I noticed was
that they repeat the exact same words over and over again. And, furthermore, the
ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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other things that I have noticed with children who have been coached is generally
they are coached to use a much more sophisticated set of words than I saw that
Angie used. The words she used were the words of a young child and in many ways
a child, even though she was older at the time she was testifying, they were the
words of a child who is fairly - clear to the Court fairly unsophisticated. What I
found particularly important is, as the prosecutor pointed out, she credibly
described ejaculate. She described it as a wet bed. Now, if she were being coached,
she would have described it differently and I think it is something that the jury
picked up on. It's certainly something that I picked up on in listening to her. She
did not seem to know what it was, but she described pretty accurately what it would
be like if there was ejaculate on the bed.
The Court carefully observed how consistent the child's testimony was, finding no evidence to
suggest she had been coached. In particular, the Court noted that the child was able to describe the
lubricant Esquivel used and where it was in his bedroom. The Court observed:
Furthermore, I noticed that while the majority of the times that she said that
she was sexually assaulted occurred in the one bedroom, there was one incident
which she described in the master bedroom. I found that rather significant because
the description in that case was significantly different. She was able to describe
where the lubricant was kept, something a child normally would not even know
about in going into a room unless she's seen someone take it down and use it in a
specific way. Children, and, quite frankly, even I as an adult am not observant
enough to notice when someone has lubricant in their bedroom, but she was able to
describe that and describe how it was used.
The Court also found that the child's difficulty in describing anatomical parts was consistent with
her age and suggested she had not been coached, contrary to Esquivel's claims.
When I looked at all those things, I came to the conclusion that contrary to
what the Defendant says, this is not a child who's -who has been coached. This
was a child who was, I think, credibly testifying to what she observed and as I
indicated, she didn't really waiver too much in what she was describing and she had
difficulty in describing the anatomical parts which I found to be interesting, too.
The Court observed the real fear that the child victim experienced and noted that her
manner of disclosure was consistent with the typical way in which these kinds of crimes are
discovered. The Court stated as follows:

I thought, again, her testimony was quite - was quite understandable and when I
looked at the CARES tape, it was interesting, again, that she testified there that she
was very - she was fearful for Marissa [her cousin] and that in part this is what
caused her to come forward. I also found that the way in which the report came
out, a spontaneous report at a friend's house with a person with whom she felt
comfortable, is a fairly typical way things like this would come out and she made it
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clear it was not something she wanted to do, she didn't plan it, and she didn't report
to her adoptive mother, instead she reported to a friend, and a fiiend, like I said, that
she felt comfortable with. She was obviously uncomfortable discussing it with her
adoptive mother and I think in listening to her, that she was - it seemed to me
anyway that she was concerned about the impact because she's not stupid, she's a
very bright young person, the impact this potentially was going to have on her
family.
The Court also discussed the impact this crime would have on the victim and on her
family.
In looking at what she has written and what she testified to, it is clear that
she is, still scared. This has impacted her in ways that will come out and unfold
over the years. She has been changed forever. Hopefully she will survive this and
become a stronger person. But let's make no bones about it, this is a young girl
whose life has been changed forever and I would suggest that this entire family's
life has been changed forever. It was an extreme violation of the child's trust and
it's the result of a series and continual bad choices that I believe were made on the
part of the Defendant.
The Court also noted that while Esquivel's lack of cooperation with the psychosexual
examiner could be consistent with someone who was innocent of the charges, his continued denial
made treatment and rehabilitation problematic. The Court stated: "I will also note that I did take
into account that his lack of amenability to treatment and also his clear use of illegal substances"
including heroin.
Given all of this, this Court imposed a thu-ty (30) year aggregate sentence with fifteen (15)
year(s) fixed and fifteen (15) year(s) indeterminate on each of the three counts of Lewd Conduct
with a Minor Under Sixteen. On the Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen, the Court
imposed fifteen (15) years aggregate with five (5) years fixed and ten (10) years indeterminate. All
sentences were to run concurrently.
Esquivel moved the Court to reconsider, and the Court denied his Motion. Esquivel
appealed and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's verdict and the Court's sentence in an
unpublished opinion.
On July 15, 2005, Esquivel filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief, claiming ineffective
trial counsel based on several allegations. On December 12, 2005, afler numerous motions, the
Court dismissed his Amended Petition and Esquivel appealed.

On August 3, 2007, in an

unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court in part and, reversed it in part,

I!
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1

Appeals instructed this Court to appoint counsel to "assist Esquivel in pursuing the

llpost-conviction claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to arrange an independent

1)
4

6

psychosexual evaluation or otherwise mitigate the effects of the court-ordered evaluation."

The Court appointed counsel to pursue the only remaining claim, ". . . that his counsel was
111 ineffective
in failing to arrange an independent psychosexual evaluation or otherwise mitigate the
11 effects of the court-ordered evaluation," as provided by the Court of Appeals decision. Esquivel
filed a Second Amended Petition and on remand, in addition to claiming his counsel was

7

11

ineffective for failing to question the conduct of the exam or to request a different expert to
conduct an independent examination, he now asserts for the first time that his counsel was

1) ineffective because he failed to advise Petitioner that he could have simply chosen not to

1o
l1
12

I

participate at all in the evaluation.

abandoned his claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to question the
IIIIconductEsquivel
of the psychosexual evaluation or to request a different expert to conduct an independent
examination, because he presented no argument or evidence regarding these claims to the Court.

13

l4
15

ANALYSIS

for Post Conviction Relief can be filed at any time within one year from the
1111 expirationA petition
of the time for appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following appeal,
ever is later. I.C. 19-4902. In this case, Esquivel was sentenced on January 13, 2004. The
11 which
Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence on December 3, 2004, and filed the Remittitur March 2,
I1112005.
Esquivel timely filed his post-conviction Petition on July 13,2005.
tj

l6

l7
18

II

11
20

21
22
23

24
25

11

Esquivel appealed the Court's decision dismissing his Amended Petition and on August 3,
2007, in an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court in part and, reversed it
in part, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals' ruling. In

IIparticular, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:

Esquivel's application, in essence, claims his trial counsel was deficient for failing
to either question the conduct of the expert who performed the evaluation or request
a different expert conduct a new psychosexual evaluation. . . .
While we offer no opinion on the appropriateness of his trial counsel's conduct, the
facts alleged by Esquivel, combined with the record, raises the possibility of a valid
claim as to counsel's inaction regarding the psychosexual evaluation. . . . on
remand, we instruct the district court to appoint counsel to assist Esquivel in

26
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pursuing the post-conviction claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to
arrange an independent psychosexual evaluation or otherwise mitigate the effects of
the court-ordered evaluation.

1

2

(Emphasis in the opinion.)
3

Esquivel filed a Second Amended Petition and on remand, in addition to claiming his

4

counsel ineffective for failing to question the conduct of the exam or to request a different expert
to conduct an independent examination, he now asserts for the first time that his counsel was
ineffective because he failed

6

to advise Petitioner he could have simply chosen not to participate at all in the
evaluation.
The evaluation by Dr. Engle, among other things, indicates the Petitioner to
not be a candidate for outpatient sex offender treatment, in part because of the
Petitioner's denial during the examination, that he had sexually abused the alleged
victim in the substantive case.
Esquivel relied on Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 563, 149 P.3d 833, 838 (2006), decided after

11

'1
" II
11
14

l5

17

this Court's decision dismissing his Amended Petition. Esquivel supported his Second Amended
Petition with an affidavit from his trial counsel in which his trial counsel testified that he did not
advise Esquivel of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during the psychosexual evaluation.
Esquivel also indicated no evidentiary hearing was necessary.

to summarily dismiss Esquivel's Second Amended Petition on February
11 13, 2008,TheandStatefiledmoved
additional argument on June 4, 2008. Esquivel filed argument on April 7,

11

11

2008. The Court heard oral argument on June 4,2008, and took the matter under advisement.
An application for post-conviction relief is in the nature of a civil proceeding, entirely

18

distinct from the underlying criminal proceeding. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 798, 25 P.3d

l9

110, 111 (2001). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary

20

civil action, however, because an application must contain much more than "a short and plain

z1

statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Hernandez v.
State, 133 Idaho 794,797, 992 P.2d 789, 792 (Ct. App. 1999). The application must present or be

22

accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject
23
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to dismissal. Id. Finally, a petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claims are based. I.C.R. 57(c).'

1I

In this case, Esquivel's claim is ineffective counsel. Esquivel does not claim the sentence
imposed was illegal or that there were any grounds to suppress evidence.
A.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an applicant for post-conviction
6
7

Itrelief must demonstrate (I) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of

(1 reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result

would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Estrada v.
State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006).
First, to establish a deficiency, Esquivel has the burden of showing that his attorney's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Matthews v. State, 136 Idaho
46, 49, 28 P.3d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 2001); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174,
1176 (1988). As the Estrada court held, an attorney's performance falls below the objective

12

l3

l4
15
16
17

11

11
11

standard of reasonableness and is thus deficient if he fails to inform his client of the right to remain
silent or right to not participate in a court ordered psychosexual evaluation. Estrada, 143 Idaho at
564, 149 P.3d at 839. Esquivel's attorney testified that he did not inform Esquivel of his right to
remain silent during the psychosexual evaluation. Thus, Esquivel has proven by a preponderance
of the evidence that his attorney's advice, or lack of advice, was deficient. That does not end the
inquiry. The Estrada court did not change the requirement that Esquivel prove he was prejudiced
by the deficient advice.
Second, in order to succeed on post-conviction, Esquivel must show, bv a preponderance
of the evidence, that he was actually prejudiced by his attorney's deficiency or, in this case, that his
sentence would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92; Ramirez v. State, 119 Idaho
1037, 1041, 812 P.2d 75 1, 755 (Ct. App.1991). "To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial
would have been different." Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 (2002)
(quoting Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 282, 32 P.3d 672, 674 (Ct. App.2001)). In other words,

25

I

I.C.R. 57(c). Burden of Proof. The petitioner shall have the burden of proving the petitioner's grounds for relief by a

26
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it is not enough for Esquivel to simply show that the attorney's error had some conceivable effect
1

on his sentence as virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test. Strickland, 466
2

U.S. at 693.

3

B.

4

The Idaho Supreme Court in Estrada recognized that prior to sentencing, the Fifth

5

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel apply

Esquivel cannot show the requisite prejudice.

to psychosexual evaluations ordered by the court to be conducted prior to sentencing. Estrada,

6

143 Idaho at 563-64, 149 P.3d at 838-389. An attorney's performance falls below the objective
7

standard of reasonableness and is thus deficient if he fails to inform the client of the right to
remain silent or the right to not participate in a court ordered psychosexual evaluation. Estrada,
143 Idaho at 564, 149 P.3d at 839.

9

lo

the Idaho Supreme Court did not change the long standing rule that even if a
11 defendantHowever,
the attorney failed to properly advise the defendant, the defendant must still
IIprove by aproves
preponderance of the evidence "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

12

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 565, 149 P.3d
13

at 840 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "[R]easonable probability is a probability sufficient

l4

to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. And as the United States Supreme Court continued

l5

Strickland "In making this determination [referring to the prejudice prong], a court hearing an
11 inineffectiveness
claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury." 466 U.S.

,

17

at 696. The United States Supreme Court in Strickland carefully analyzed the prejudice required

1 in order to support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel as follows:

An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting

I

26

II

I

aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the
judgment. CJ: United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-365, 101 S.Ct. 665,
667- 668,66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981). The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee
of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify
reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in
counsel's performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute
ineffective assistance under the Constitution.

preponderance of the evidence.
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It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable
effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtuallv evew act or omission of counsel
would meet that test, c j United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 866867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446-3447, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982), and not every error that
conceivablv could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the
result of the proceeding. Respondent suggests requiring a showing that the errors
"impaired the presentation of the defense." Brief for Respondent 58. That
standard, however, provides no workable principle. Since any error, if it is indeed
an error, "impairs" the presentation of the defense, the proposed standard is
inadequate because it provides no way of deciding what impairments are
sufficiently serious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding.
466 U.S. at 691-93 (emphasis added).
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court in addressing the prejudice component of
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim makes the following observation:
Although we have discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness
claim prior to the prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding an
ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to
address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient
showing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel's
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered bv the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness
claim is not to grade counsel's performance. If it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect
will often be so, that course should be followed. Courts should strive to ensure that
ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire
criminal justice system suffers as a result.
466 U.S. at 697 (emphasis added).
Because this case is not one where prejudice is presumed,2 Esquivel must affirmatively
prove prejudice. Actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance, such
as Esquivel's, are inherently fact sensitive. Because errors by counsel are just as likely to be
harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial, they cannot be classified according to
likelihood of causing prejudice. They must be considered on a case-by-case basis. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 693. In order to properly consider Esquivel's claim, the Court must analyze Estrada
and compare the Estrada facts to those here.
- -

In certain contexts prejudice is presumed. These include: actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel
altogether, state interference with counsel's assistance, and actual conflicts of interest. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at
692. None of these apply in Esquivel's case.

I
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The facts in Estrada are important. In Estrada, unlike this case, the defendant pled guilty,
1

11

11
4

6
7

thus admitting responsibility. Esquivel, on the other hand, was found guilty after a jury trial in
which he testified repeatedly that he was innocent after being properly advised of his right to
remain silent.

Estrada was initially uncooperative in the psychosexual evaluation and, in fact,
11 he wroteMoreover,
district court, asserting that the evaluation was unnecessary and caused a frustrating
1111 delay in histo thesentencing.
Estrada's attorney responded by writing a letter to Estrada advising him

11

that the evaluation was not a delay tactic, but "must be completed before sentencing." The
attorney also commented, "I want every single good piece of evidence that I can get my hands on

8

to be able to argue at your sentencing." Based on the letter, Estrada decided to participate in the
evaluation.

lo

l1

Later, however, Estrada again became uncooperative and failed to complete certain
11 evaluation
forms, which prompted the evaluator to contact Estrada's attorney to relay Estrada's

II

12

l3
l4

1
11

refusal to cooperate. The attorney sent Estrada another letter, in which he noted that the evaluation
was ordered by the district court. The attorney wrote, "We would not want the judge to consider

your lack of cooperation to mean that you are not willing to comply with court orders."
Thereafter, Estrada participated in the evaluation, which took place in the county jail.

The

15

evaluation was filed with the district court and included a number of unfavorable and derogatory

16

comments about Estrada, including references to his potential for future violent actions.

17
18

Unlike Estrada, Esquivel never cooperated in his psychosexual evaluation. He refused to

1) complete psychometric testing making the evaluator conclude that "clinically
11 information had

19

been lost."

significant

He maintained his innocence throughout the testing, made no

incriminating statements and, in fact, the reported statements in the evaluation are consistent with
those he made at trial.
While in Estrada the sentencing judge3 made specific, repeated references to the

21

22

j3

11

psychosexual evaluation and its finding that Estrada was a violent person and clearly relied on it in

I1

arriving at the sentence, that did not happen in this case. In this case, the only reason this Court

3

25

The judge who decided the post-conviction petition in Estrada was a different judge. Therefore, any findings by the
post-conviction judge were not based on personal knowledge, unlike in this case.
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discussed the psychosexual evaluation at all was because the Court had ordered the evaluation.
This Court, at sentencing, only noted several times that Esquivel continued to maintain his
innocence during the psychosexual evaluation causing the evaluator to conclude that he was not
amenable to treatment placing him at moderate risk to reoffend. However, the Court already knew
he was not amenable to rehabilitation, because he denied culpability at trial. The psychosexual
evaluation itself added no new information to what this Court already knew based on Esquivel's
testimony at trial. In fact, his lack of participation in the psychosexual evaluation was predictable
given his trial testimony.4 In view of Esquivel's testimony, there is nothing in the psychosexual
evaluation that could have affected the Court's sentence.
While the Court of Appeals suggests in its decision that the mention5 of the psychosexual
evaluation implied that the Court relied on the report, that is not the case. This Court determined
Esquivel's sentence based on the testimony he gave and the evidence produced at trial and not on
the psychosexual evaluation. The psychosexual evaluation did not increase or reduce his sentence.
Esquivel did not receive a different sentence, either enhanced or reduced, based on his refusal to
cooperate in the psychosexual evaluation or because of its contents. It was his failure to accept
responsibility that demonstrated rehabilitation was unlikely.
It is well established that Idaho trial courts may consider a defendant's failure to accept
responsibility in determining whether rehabilitation efforts would be fruitful when imposing
sentence. See State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 494, 988 P.2d 715, 720 (Ct. App.1999); State v.
Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 73, 95 1 P.2d 1288, 1300 (Ct. App.1998); State v. Wheeler, 129 Idaho 735,
932 P.2d 363 (Ct. App.1997); State v. Smith, 127 Idaho 632,903 P.2d 1329 (Ct. App.1995); State
v. Fertig, 126 Idaho 364, 883 P.2d 722 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Nooner, 114 Idaho 654, 656, 759
P.2d 945, 947 (Ct. App.1988). A trial court may consider the failure to take responsibility for

4

Following this sentencing, the Court no longer orders psychosexual evaluations where the defendant either testifies
that he is innocent or enters an Alford plea, because the result is predictable, just as Esquivel's attorney opined at
Esquivel's sentencing.
At sentencing trial courts frequently identify those things the court has read or reviewed. A trial court is required to
reflect on everything in a pre-sentence report and cannot simply ignore material. That does not mean, however, those
items become factors in the sentence. For example, the trial court reads and considers the numerous letters often
received in support of a defendant or letters from victims but that does not mean those letters change the sentence in
every case.

I1
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crimes committed in considering the defendant's potential for rehabilitation. See Murphy, 133
Idaho at 494,988 P.2d at 720. That is what happened here.

In reviewing the record, it is clear that this Court's references to the psychosexual
evaluation were limited to its conclusion regarding Esquivel's amenability to treatment and
rehabilitation, a matter long held to be appropriate to sentencing, and a conclusion clearly
predicted by his own testimony at trial. Therefore, Esquivel cannot establish that this Court's
exercise of its discretion in considering his lack of amenability to treatment and in sentencing was
caused by any violation of his Fifih Amendment rights; he cannot prove prejudice, the second
prong of Strickland.
Likewise, if Esquivel had actually incriminated hmself by making unwarned statements
during the psychosexual evaluation that caused the Court to learn something it did not already
know, the result may have been different on post-conviction. Esquivel was clearly exercising h s
constitutional rights and the Court did not hold that against him. However, the fact is Esquivel
made no incriminating statements and the Court learned nothing it did not already know; Esquivel
continued to proclaim his innocence and did not cooperate in the psychosexual evaluation. He was
not prejudiced by his counsel's actions. Therefore, the Court finds Esquivel cannot establish a
reasonable probability that, but for h s trial counsel's unprofessional errors, the sentence would
have been different as required by Strickland.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the Second Amended Petition and any evidence in a light most favorable
to Esquivel, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Esquivel is not entitled to post-conviction relief.

I.C. $19-4906(2). The Court W h e r finds there is no dispute of material fact and no purpose
would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore, by this order, the Court dismisses
Esquivel's Petition. At the same time, the Court has ordered the psychosexual evaluation removed
from the pre-sentence report in Case No, H0300476 and sealed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 12" day of September, 2008.

&

c

h

Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge
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I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that on September

/b

,

1

(1

II

2008 I mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the ORDER DISMISSING SECOND

AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d)
I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows:

GREG H. BOWER
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
JEAN FISHER
DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
200 W. FRONT STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702-5954
LAYNE DAVIS
DAVIS & WALKER
200 NORTH 4THSTREET, SUITE 302
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
Ada Wty,-ldaho
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I

a

'Layne Davis
DAVIS & WALKER
200 North 4thStreet, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 429- 1200
Facsimile: (208) 429- 1100
Idaho State Bar No. 4640
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CARLOS ESQUIVEL,
Petitioner,

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case No. SPOT 05-00561

)

1
1

VS.

TO:

1
1

NOTICE OF APPEAL

1
1
1
)

ALL PARTIES, THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, appeals against the above named

Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court fiom District Court in the Judgment and Order
Dismissing Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, entered in the above-entitled
action on September 16,2008, the Honorable Judge Cheri Copsey presiding.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Judgments or Orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and pursuant
to Rule 11 (c) I.A.R.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 1
A

00095

3.

Whether the denial for the Petitioner's Post Conviction Relief application violated

the procedural and substantive due process standards guaranteed by the U.S. and Idaho
Constitutions.
4.

An order dated September 15,2008 removed the psychosexual evaluation from

the pre-sentence report and further ordered that it be sealed. No Order has been entered sealing
any portion of the record.
5.

A reporter's transcript is requested.

6.

Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, requests the preparation of the following portions of

the reporter's transcript: The entire standard transcript as defined in Idaho Appellant Rules
25(a). In addition to the standard transcript, the Appellant requests the preparation of the
reporter's transcript for the Evidentiary Hearing held on June 4,2008.
7.

I certify:
a.

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set
out below:
1.

b.

Kim Madsen, 200 W. Front St., Boise, Idaho 83702

'

That Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, is exempt from paying the estimated
transcript fee because he is an indigent person.

c.

That Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, is exempt from paying the estimated fee
for preparation of the record because he is an indigent person.

d.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Idaho Appellant Rules Rule 20 and the Attorney General.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 2

.
'DATED this

,)"

4

&day of October, 2008.
DAVIS & WALKER

BY
Layne Davis
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE 0 6 SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
of October, 2008,I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
200 W. Front St., Rrn. 3191
Boise, ID 83702

1

1
C1

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
FACSIMILE
OVERNIGHT MAIL

1

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
FACSIMILE
OVERNIGHT MAIL

[

[

Kim Madsen
Court Reporter
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83702

[

Attorney General's Office
Statehouse, Room 2 10
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

1
1

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
FACSIMILE
OVERNIGHT MAIL

1
1: 1
[ 1

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
FACSIMILE
OVERNIGHT MAIL

C1
[
[

State of Idaho
Office of State Appellant Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Ln.
Boise, ID 83703

[

DAVIS & WALKER

BY
Layne Davis
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL - Page 3

Layne Davis
DAVIS & WALKER
200 North 4' Street, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 429- 1200
Facsimile: (208) 429- 1100
Idaho State Bar No. 4640
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CARLOS ESQUIVEL,

1
)

Case No. SPOT 05-00561

)

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT TO
APPOINT STATE APPELLATE
PUBLIC DEFENDER

1

Petitioner,
VS.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

1
1
)
)

1

Respondent.

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, by and through his attorney of record,
Layne Davis of Davis & Walker, conflict counsel for the Ada County Public Defender's Office,
and hereby moves this Honorable Court to appoint the State Appellate Public Defender's Office
to represent the above-named Petitioner in the above-entitled matter for the reasons set forth in
this Affidavit attached hereto.
DATED this

&? rdday of October, 2008.
DAVIS & WALKER

BY

*

Layne Davis
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT TO APPOINT STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER - Page 1

STATE OF IDAHO

1
1ss

County of Ada'

1

LAYNE DAVIS, first being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney with Davis & Walker, conflict counsel for the Ada County

Public Defender's Office, in this case.
2.

Counsel for the above-named Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order

Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, entered in the above-entitled action on October 23,
2008.
3.

The general practice in the Ada County Public Defender's Office, as well as in

our office as conflict counsel for the Public Defender, is to submit a Motion and Order
appointing State Appellate Public Defender concurrently with filing the Notice of Appeal on
appeals filed after September 15, 1998.
4.

Ada County is participating fully in the State Appellate Public Defender program.

5.

Petitioner is entitled to counsel on appeal and is entitled to the services of the

State Appellate Public Defender.
DAVIS & WALKER

Layne Davis
Conflict Counsel fyr Petitioner

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this&

.
.Iof October, 2008.
day

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT TO APPOINT STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER - Page 2

()0099

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

33%~

of October, 2008,I caused to be served a
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
200 W. Front St., Rm. 3 191
Boise, ID 83702

[

1

[
[

1
1

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
FACSIMILE
OVERNIGHT MAIL

1
1
1

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
FACSIMILE
OVERNIGHT MAIL

1
1
1

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
FACSIMILE
OVERNIGHT MAIL

1
1
1

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
FACSIMILE
OVERNIGHT MAIL

-

Kim Madsen
Court Reporter
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83702

[
[
[

Attorney General's Office
Statehouse, Room 2 10
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

[

State of Idaho
Office of State Appellant Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Ln.
Boise, ID 83703

[
[

[
[

[

DAVIS & WALKER

BY
Layne Davis
Conflict Counsel for Petitioner
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Layne Davis
DAVIS & WALKER
200 North 41h Street, Suite 302
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 429-1200
Facsimile: (208) 429- 1100
Idaho State Bar No. 4640

OCT 2 8 2008

Conflict Counsel for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CARLOS ESQUIVEL,

)

Case No. SPOT 05-0056 1

1
1
1

Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER APPOINTING STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
ON DIRECT APPEAL

)

1

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Respondent.

1
1

The above-named Petitioner, Carlos Esquivel, being indigent and having heretofore been
represented by the Ada County Public Defender's Office in the District Court, and said
Petitioner/Appellant having elected to pursue a direct appeal in the above-entitled matter;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that the Idaho State
Appellate Public Defender is appointed to represent the above-named PetitionerIAppellant,
Carlos Esquivel, in all matters pertaining to the direct appeal.

F

DATED this

a$*day of October, 2008.
BY

~ L A L L
The Honorable i:dge

&eri Copsey
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CARLOS ESQUIVEL,
Supreme Court Case No. 35792
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

VS.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 8th day of December, 2008.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

BY

BR/\.nll..EYJ. THlES " .

Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CARLOS ESQUNEL,
Supreme Court Case No. 35792
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certiQ that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
Date of Service:

DEC 0 9 2098

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

BRADLEV J - TMlES

BY
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CARLOS ESQUIVEL,
Supreme Court Case No. 35792
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTEICATE TO RECORD

VS.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
24th day of October, 2008.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

BY
Deputy Clerk
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

